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THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION IS BEING DOWNLOADED: WHY
AND HOW THE COPYRIGHT ACT MUST CHANGE
TO ACCOMMODATE AN EVER-EVOLVING
MUSIC INDUSTRY
MARCY RAUER WAGMAN, ESQ.* AND RACHEL ELLEN Kopp, EsQ.**
I. INTRODUCTION
Nothing in recent memory has jolted the music industry into
such an extraordinarily swift paradigm shift as the Internet and its
ubiquity. Digital subscription services and non-subscription music
delivery services,' Internet radio stations, illegal downloading, blog-
ging, 2 and podcasting3 cascaded quickly into the consumer con-
* Entertainment attorney with the Law Offices of Marcy Rauer Wagman, Esq.
in Philadelphia, PA; J.D., Villanova University School of Law; member of PA Bar
Association, ASCAP, NMPA, voting member of NARAS (Grammy Awards organiza-
tion). The author is on the Board of Directors of Junction Dance Theatre Com-
pany and the Advisory Board of the Villanova Sports and Entertainment Law
Journal. The author is currently Program Director of the Bachelor of Science in
Music Industry Program at Drexel University in Philadelphia, PA where she heads
MAD Dragon Entertainment, which includes the nationally distributed MAD
Dragon Records, Drako Booking Agency, and MAD Dragon Publishing. Addition-
ally, she is an award winning composer and music producer of major label record-
ing artists and commercial broadcast music.
** Associate with Spector, Roseman, & Kodroff, P.C. in Philadelphia, PA;J.D.,
Villanova University School of Law; B.A., University of Maryland. The author prac-
tices primarily in securities and antitrust litigation.
1. See, e.g., Rhapsody, http://www.real.com/rhapsody/ (last visited Mar. 1,
2006) (showing digital subscription service); Apple - iPod + iTunes®, http://www.
apple.com/itunes/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2006) (representing non-subscription mu-
sic delivery service).
2. See Blog, http://www.marketingterms.com/dictionary/blog/ (last visited
Mar. 1, 2006) (defining term "blog"). The term "blog" is an abbreviated, collo-
quial version of the term "weblog" or "web log." See id. Blog refers to a serial
online publication of a person's periodic journal, commentary, and ideas
presented with or without music, along with relevant links to other sites on the
Internet. See Content and Community: Blog, http://www.marketingterms.com/
dictionary/12/ (Mar. 1, 2006). Website serial journals existed before the term
"blog" emerged, but the introduction of automated published systems, such as
Blogger at blogger.com, facilitated the sudden surge in the popularity of blogs. See
Blogger: What's a Blog?, http://www.blogger.com/start (follow "Take A Quick
Tour" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 1, 2006) (explaining definition of blog along
with recent popularity).
3. See Answers.com: Podcasting - Name, http://www.answers.com/topic/pod
casting?method=6 (last visited Mar. 1, 2006) (providing history of podcasts and
noting that term "podcast" developed around 2004 from combining "ipod" and
"broadcasting"). Podcasting uses the RSS 2.0 file format and requires a subscriber
to use "podcatching" software, which downloads and detects new content that can
be synchronized with the subscriber's personal audio player. See Answers.com:
(271)
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sciousness. These delivery modes were all virtually nonexistent a
mere decade ago. Even music industry executives did not foresee a
Podcast - Technology, http://www.answers.com/topic/podcast?hl=podcasting
(last visited Mar. 1, 2006). Generally, "[a] 'podcast' is a web feed of audio or video
files placed on the Internet to which anyone can subscribe." Answers.com:
Wikipedia - Podcasting, http://www.answers.com/main/ntquery?method=4&dsid=
1512&dekey=podcasting&gwp=8&curtab=1512_1&linktext=podcasting (last visited
Mar. 1, 2006). Wikipedia Encyclopedia further describes "podcasting" as the
following:
Podcasting is the distribution of audio or video files, such as radio pro-
grams or music videos, over the internet using either RSS or Atom syndi-
cation for listening on mobile devices and personal computers ...
Podcasters' websites also may offer direct download of their files, but the
subscription feed of automatically delivered new content is what distin-
guishes a podcast from a simple download or real-time streaming.
Wikipedia: Podcasting, 1 1, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Podcasting (last visited
Mar. 1, 2006) (defining term "podcasting"). Wikipedia Encyclopedia further
describes:
While the name was primarily associated with audio subscriptions in
2004, the RSS enclosure syndication technique had been used with video
files since 2001, before portable video players were widely available [with
or without the syllable "pod" in their names] .... In fact, any file with a
URL, including still images and text, can be delivered via a web feed.
[The u]se of "podcast" to describe both audio and video feeds
seemed natural to some users, while others preferred to reserve the word
for audio and coin new terms for video subscriptions. Other "pod-" de-
rived neologisms include "podcasters" for individuals or organizations of-
fering feeds, and "podcatchers" for special RSS aggregators with the
ability to transfer the files to media player software or hardware.
Id. (follow "Name" hyperlink) 11 2-3.
Today, podcasting has become so prevalent that the world-renowned Oxford
English Dictionary has included the following definition for "podcast" in its 2005
version: "a digital recording of a radio broadcast or similar program, made availa-
ble on the Internet for downloading to a personal audio player." 'Podcast' Is the
Word of the Year, PRNEwswIPE, Dec. 5, 2005, http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/
storiespl?ACCT=104&STORY=/www/story/12-05-2005/0004228195&EDATE= (de-
fining podcast); see also Oxford English Dictionary Adds Podcast Definition, Podcasting
News, Aug. 13, 2005, http://www.podcastingnews.com/archives/2005/08/oxford_
english.html (describing how Oxford added term "podcast" to its dictionary). Us-
ing licensed music in a podcast raises various questions regarding the payment of
royalties and statutory licenses for the underlying compositions and sound record-
ings. See Wikipedia: Adoption by Traditional Broadcasters, http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Podcasting#Adoptionby-traditional broadcasters (last visited Mar. 1,
2006) (discussing use of podcasting by traditional broadcasters, specifically news
and talk shows which avoid music licensing complications). Even incidental use of
copyright-protected music will necessitate the payment of royalties to the copyright
owner and the sound recording copyright owner. See Wikipedia: Podcasting and
Music Royalties, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Podcasting#Podcasting-and-Music
-Royalties (last visited Mar. 2, 2006) (discussing problems with "bumper" music at
beginning and end of news podcasts). Currently, in addition to their musical uses,
podcasts are used for non-music broadcasts, museum tours, and "controversial nar-
rations" of art works by professors and art students. See Answers.com: Podcast, 2,
http://www.answers.com/topic/podcast?hl=podcasting (last visited Mar. 1, 2006)
(discussing other uses for podcasts).
[Vol. 13: p. 271
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fair number of these new content delivery modes. Today, legal ver-
sions of file sharing are exploding exponentially. 4
In 1999, the overnight invasion of Napster blindsided every-
one, causing industry-wide consternation and chaos.5 Facing this
unknown powerhouse, the Recording Industry Association of
America ("RAA"),6 made a knee-jerk reaction by suing its own
consumers.7 Recording artists either hailed Napster as a visionary,
representing freedom of speech and the ultimate promotional
tool,8 or they complained about the devastation of their royalty
4. See Legitimate Music Downloading Enjoys Dream Week, CNET NEWS.cOM, Jan. 8,
2006, http://news.com.com/2102-1027_.3-6023769.html?tag=st.util.print (discuss-
ing enormous spending on digital downloads during week after Christmas 2005).
5. See Michael Fine, CEO of SoundScan, Inc., Report of Michael Fine, CEO of
SoundScan, Inc., 1 (June 10, 2000), http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/nap-
ster/riaa/fine.pdf (reporting at plaintiffs request in A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), affd in part, rev'd in part, 239 F.3d 1004
(9th Cir. 2001)). Fine described the negative impact of Napster on retail record-
ing sales in and around colleges and universities across the United States. See id. at
1-3; see also Richard Menta, R!AA Sues Music Startup Napster for $20 Billion, MP3
NEWSWTRE.NET, Dec. 9, 1999, http://www.mp3newswire.net/stories/napster.html
(discussing copyright infringement lawsuit filed by Recording Industry Association
of America ("RIAA") against Napster).
6. See RIAA.com, http://www.riaa.com/about/default.asp (follow "About Us"
hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 1, 2006) (defining RIAA as "trade group that repre-
sents" U.S. recording industry).
7. See Erika Morphy, R/AA Lawsuit Binge Continues, NEWSFACTOR MAG. ONLINE,
May 25, 2004, http://www.newsfactor.com/perl/story/24202.html (discussing law-
suits filed against people for illegally downloading). In an attempt to curtail illegal
file sharing and downloading of music on the Internet, the RJAA has sued
thousands of Americans. See id. Brianna LaHara, a twelve-year-old honors student
from New York, was among the first to be sued for sharing music. See Downloading
Girl Escapes Lawsuit, Sept. 9, 2003, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/08/28/
tech/printable570507.shtml (recapping story of lawsuit against twelve-year-old
girl). Eventually, Brianna's mother agreed to pay $2,000 to settle the lawsuit. See
id. 1. Critics wondered whether the music industry was in fact being "overzeal-
ous" in its quest to rid the world of illegal downloaders. See id. 7. To this end,
Verizon Communications Inc.'s lead lawyer, William Barr, complained that "music
lawyers had resorted to a 'campaign against 12-year-old girls' rather than trying to
help consumers turn to legal sources for songs online." Id. 1 8. Despite the
RIAA's efforts, a poll taken by Harris Interactive between April 14 and April 20,
2004, demonstrated that breaking the law did not deter teenagers and children
from downloading music. See Morphy, supra, 1 6. In fact, they are more fearful of
the possibility of downloading a virus than breaking the law. See id.
8. See Aaron Page, Napster Faces the Music, NEWSHOUR ExTRA, May 31, 2000,
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/features/jan-juneOO/napster.html (listing
Napster fans including rapper Chuck D and rocker Fred Durst, who support Nap-
ster as promotional tool).
In fact, Durst has stated, "We could care less about the older generation's
need to keep doing business as usual. We care more about what our fans want-
and our fans want music on the Internet." Michelle Manafy, AndJustice For All: The
Napster Chronicles - Company Business and Marketing, EMEDIA PROF., 15, July 2000,
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mimOFXG/is_7_13/ai_63857408/print
(elaborating on Durst's view toward Napster). Durst, with opening band Cypress
273
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payday by taking legal action against Napster and its similar
cousins.9
The music industry failed to acknowledge that the citizens of
the world have an unquenchable, insatiable appetite for music. De-
spite the current United States Copyright Act of 1976 (the "Act")10
blocking consumers' access to music, people continue to seek out
songs. The Act's mission, from its earliest incarnation, was to con-
struct incentives for authors to create works and to allow the public
access to those works. Thus, through this access, the public could
learn, enjoy, and develop new works from known works. 1' More
Hill, took part in a free, Napster-sponsored tour to support Napster's role in pro-
viding music to large numbers of people. See id. 6. Instead of alienating fans of
music and technological innovations, Durst has publicly embraced Napster, calling
it a tool "to promote awareness of bans and to market music." Id.
9. See Manafy, supra note 8, 4 (listing artists who gave Napster ultimatums).
During Napster's early days, several artists, including hip-hop mogul Dr. Dre and
heavy metal band Metallica, issued ultimatums to Napster, threatening to file suit
against Napster unless it removed all of their music from its directories. They were
upset because every song downloaded for free on Napster was able to bypass any
royalty payments required to be made to the artists. See id. 9 4-5; see also John
Borland, Unreleased Madonna Single Slips on to Net, CNET NEws.coM, June 1, 2000,
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-241341.html?legacy=CNet (discussing record la-
bel's anger when unreleased Madonna works leaked onto Napster).
However, Napster refused to remove its music, claiming that it had no respon-
sibility for piracy committed by its users. See Manafy, supra note 8, 4. Metallica
eventually brought suit against Napster for copyright infringement, as well as
against universities such as Yale and the University of Southern California. See
Wikipedia: Metallica, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metallica#Napstercontro-
versy (last visited Mar. 1, 2006) (elaborating on Napster controversy). "In 2001,
Metallica and Napster agreed to an out-of-court settlement which led to many Nap-
ster user accounts being locked out. The band did not take action to sue any
individuals for copyright infringement." Id.; see also James Brewer, Rock Band
Launches Suit Against Internet Music Downloads, May 5, 2000, http://www.wsws.org/
articles/2000/may2000/naps-m05.shtml (discussing Metallica's anti-Napster atti-
tude). Many of Dr. Dre's and Metallica's peers have agreed with their sentiment.
See Page, supra note 8 (setting forth both anti- and pro-Napster sentiments among
artists). Scott Stapp, lead singer of Creed has said, "My music is my home. Napster
is sneaking in the back door and robbing me blind." Id. 5. Similarly, Art Alex-
akis of the band Everclear describes Napster and its treatment of musical works as
illegal. See id. 1 7 ("It's inherently wrong. It's stealing."); see also Artists, Managers
and Industry Leaders Speak Out Against Napster, RIAA.com, http://www.riaa.com/
news/newsletter/press2000/041100_2.asp (last visited Mar. 1, 2006) (quoting ad-
ditional artists' sentiments regarding effects of Napster and other downloading
services on their livelihoods).
10. See Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2005) (amending 17 U.S.C. § 101
(2004)) (setting forth rights afforded to copyright owners).
11. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (providing Congress shall have power "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discov-
eries"). "The First Congress implemented the copyright provision of the U.S. Con-
stitution in 1790. The Copyright Act of 1790, An Act for the Encouragement of
Learning, by Securing the Copies of Maps, Charts, and Books to the Authors and
Proprietors of Such Copies, was modeled on the Statute of Anne (1710)." Time-
[Vol. 13: p. 271
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recently, however, that mission has morphed into an economic one,
where its primary impetus is the copyright owners' control over
their property. Copyright owners achieve this goal by controlling
the public's access to that property, which is antithetical to copy-
right law's underpinnings. 12
line: A History of Copyright in the United States, 1 4, http://www.arl.org/info/
frn/copy/timeline.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2006) (giving history of copyright
laws). According to the Copyright Act of 1790, American authors were able to
"print, re-print, or publish their work for a period of fourteen years and to renew
for another fourteen." Id.
The law was meant to provide an incentive to authors, artists, and scientists to
create original works by providing creators with a "limited" monopoly. The mo-
nopoly was so limited in order to stimulate creativity and the advancement of "sci-
ence and the useful arts" through wide public access to works. See Lydia Pallas
Loren, The Purpose of Copyright, OPEN SPACES Q., Jan. 12, 2006, at 17, available at
http://www.open-spaces.com/article-v2nl-loren.php (discussing history of copy-
right law).
The primary purpose of copyright is not, as many people believe, to pro-
tect authors against those who would steal the fruits of their labor. How-
ever, this misconception, repeated so often that it has become accepted
among the public as true, poses serious dangers to the core purpose that
copyright law is designed to serve.
The core purpose of copyright law is not difficult to find; it is stated
expressly in the Constitution. Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the United
States Constitution provides that Congress shall have the power: "to pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries."
This clause is the constitutional basis for the Copyright Act and also
the Patent Act. It is the only clause in the grant of powers to Congress
that has a stated purpose .... The copyright clause . . .is very specific
about its purpose. The exclusive rights that are granted to authors are
"to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." To fully appreciate
this clause, one must understand "science" in its eighteenth century
meaning. At the time of the writing of the Constitution "science" de-
noted, broadly, knowledge and learning. So the core purpose of copy-
right law, as expressly stated in the Constitution is: to promote the
progress of knowledge and learning.
Id.
12. See Loren, supra note 11, at 17 (stating history and purpose of copyright
law).
[F]ar too many people, including lawyers, have major misconceptions
concerning copyright. These misconceptions are causing a dangerous
shift in copyright protection, a shift that threatens the advancement of
knowledge and learning in this country. This shift that we are experienc-
ing in copyright law reflects a move away from viewing copyright as a
monopoly that the public is willing to tolerate in order to encourage in-
novation and creation of new works to viewing copyright as a significant
asset to this country's economy.
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a. Purpose of Article
This Article examines the current Copyright Act in the wake of
the current, fast-paced technological era. Throughout the text and
footnotes, this Article considers the following questions: What re-
sponses should Congress issue? Should Congress, through its mis-
calculations and/or stagnation, continue to allow the RIAA to label
grandmothers and twelve-year-old girls as criminals by armor-plat-
ing the protections? Alternatively, should Congress seek a radical
overhaul of the Copyright Act to address the technological realities
of today and the future? In the remainder of this Introduction, this
Article continues to discuss the tensions between the Copyright
Act's current provisions and contemporary technology. Section II
briefly discusses the history of Section 115 of the Copyright Act; this
discussion examines Section 115's history, statutory language, and
case law. Section III discusses the rights implicated by the new digi-
tal business model; to further illustrate, this section also provides
tables demonstrating the different implications. Section IV in-
troduces and uses the hypothetical of Peggy the Podcaster to
demonstrate the Copyright Act's limitations and frustrations when
applied to contemporary life. Sections V and VI propose and ex-
plain alternatives and revisions to the Copyright Act. Subsequently,
this Article discusses the anticipated beneficiaries of the proposed
amendments. Finally, Section VIII applies the proposed amend-
ments to the hypothetical of Peggy the Podcaster to demonstrate
the amendments' overall effectiveness to Peggy and the public.
b. Current Era: Copyright Act and iPods
Since its adoption in January 1978, the current Act has been
amended numerous times. 13 Despite Congress's attempts to mod-
13. SeeCopyrightAct § 101 (listing previous amendments in 2002, 2000, 1999,
1998, 1997, 1995, 1992, 1990, 1988, and 1980). In 2004, alone, there were four
amendments to the Act. See, e.g., Intellectual Property Protection and Courts
Amendments Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-482, 118 Star. 3912 (2004) (signing
occurred on Dec. 23, 2004); Title IX Satellite Home Viewer Extension and
Reauthorization Act of 2004 (contained in Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005,
Pub. L. No. 108-447, 118 Stat. 2809 (2004)) (signing occurred on Dec. 8, 2004);
Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Section 306
(amending section 121 of the Copyright Law), Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Star. 2647
(2004), (signing occurred on Dec. 3, 2004); Copyright Royalty and Distribution
Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-419, 188 Stat. 2341 (2004) (signing occurred
on Nov. 30, 2004). The most recent amendment is the Family Entertainment and
Copyright Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-9, 119 Stat. 218 (2005) (signing occurred
on Apr. 27, 2005).
[Vol. 13: p. 271
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ernize the Act through passage of its most recent amendments,' 4
the industry remains trapped in a legal quagmire. This confusion
has stymied the forward movement of technologically innovative
business models.1 5 These models could potentially salvage the mu-
sic industry and additionally allow the greatest flow of creative con-
tent between creator/author and consumer, in a very short time
span.
New technological offerings to consumers, like iFill® 16 and
iRadio®, 17 blatantly encourage infringement, thus completely dis-
14. See, e.g., Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-321, 116
Stat. 2780 (2002) (enacting legislation relevant to webcasters); Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (enacting legislation
relevant to digital technology).
15. In testimony before the 109th Congress on March 8, 2005,Jonathan Pot-
ter, Executive Director of the Digital Media Association whose members include
AOL, MSN, Napster, and RealNetworks, pleaded for an updated reformation of
the current royalty payment system under the Copyright Act. See Oversight Hearing
On Digital Music Licensing and Section 115 of the Copyright Act: Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 19-26 (2005) (testimony ofJonathan Potter, Executive Director, Digital Me-
dia Association), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/OversightTestimony.aspx?
ID=300 [hereinafter HExUNG]. Potter stated,
The victims of Section 115's failure are those who invest in the music
industry ecosystem - creators who are losing royalties, record stores that
are unable to offer comprehensive in-store CD burning services, and on-
line music companies that are not growing as fast as we should be. The
beneficiaries are those who ignore royalties and licenses and creators -
the black market networks that profit from unauthorized distribution of
free music.
Id.
Potter also attempted to alert Congress to the dilemma that legitimate music
providers face in becoming profitable in an age of alternative illegal, but free,
providers - namely, "to successfully compete against free black markets, a music
service must have a comprehensive catalog and be user-friendly, feature-rich and
fairly priced." Id.
16. See iFill - Griffin Technology, http://www.griffintechnology.com/prod-
ucts/ifill/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2006) (describing and advertising benefits of iFill).
To use iFill, a consumer simply plugs the device into her computer, selects a radio
station, and then waits for iFill to download the contents of the selected radio
station programs. See id. The consumer may then transfer the downloaded con-
tent onto the digital music device of her choice, such as an iPod. See id.
17. See 3aLab iRadio v.1.5, http://www.3alab.com/iradio.shtml (last visited
Mar. 2, 2006) (discussing and promoting iRadio). iRadio captures radio stations
and collects the station's music for the listener to save onto her hard drive or
music device. See id.; see also Philip E. Ross, Loser Motorola Becomes a Disk Jockey, IEEE
SPECTRUM, Jan. 2006, at 36 (discussing iRadio customers using device to subscribe
to channels that download music first to their computer and then to their
cellphones). Customers listen to the stored programming only once and then
purchase individual songs by pushing a button to mark each song for download.
See Ross, supra. Using iRadio's Bluetooth adapter, customers hook the phone di-
rectly into their car stereo, which then broadcasts the songs with their same origi-
nal quality. See id. If customers receive a phone call while listening to music on
their cellphone, the song can be paused "in mid-syllable." See id. For an optional
7
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regarding current copyright laws. This illegal behavior demands
rapid reprimanding and Congressional responses. Yet, such re-
sponses have not been forthcoming. Congress has attempted to
forward bills to address these situations; however, the bills have
been assailed as inadequate or overly broad, wiping out all techno-
logical innovation in their paths. 18
Traditionally, representatives of the industries primarily af-
fected by copyright law actively participated in negotiating the pa-
rameters of its revisions, helping to avoid the potential stagnation if
one industry faction decides to encourage blockage of the intro-
duced revision. 19 The resolutions of such negotiations have been
presented to Congress, which has undertaken the responsibility of
drafting amendments based upon those suggested resolutions. 20
This pattern remains the norm today, where industry representa-
fee to the cell service operator, the system can also receive and store weather and
traffic reports. See id. Listeners may also "rip" (i.e. create) their own CDs from the
radio station-collected music. See id. at 36-37.
18. See Katie Dean, Techies Blast Induce Act, WIRED NEWS, July 25, 2004, http://
www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,64315,00.html (discussing Senate hearings
and opposition by technology industry); see also Dan Pontes, P2P Legislation: Toward
a More Sensible Solution, 23 ENT. & SPORTS LAw. 14, 14 (Spring 2005) (discussing
legislative efforts to stop internet copyright infringement). The Inducing Infringe-
ment of Copyrights Act ("Induce Act") was introduced by Senator Orrin Hatch in
July 2004 and was intended to "prevent technology companies and others from
engaging in behavior that could 'induce' or encourage end users to illegally trade
in copyrighted material." Pontes, supra. In relevant part, the Act proposed to
amend section 501 of the Copyright Act to make liable as an infringer anyone who
"intentionally aids, abets, induces or procures and intent may be shown by acts
from which a reasonable person would find intent to induce infringement based
on all relevant information about such acts then reasonably available to the actor,
including whether the activity relies on infringement for its commercial viability."
Id.
Immediately upon its introduction, commentators highly criticized the Induce
Act for its unintended chilling of future technological advancements and innova-
tions and for its overbreadth. See id. Had this bill been passed, inventors and cre-
ators of any new technology that had the potential to illegally download music or
any other content could have been held liable for copyright infringement merely
by the act of creating new technology. See id. Thus, under the unintended conse-
quences of the Induce Act, copyright owners could have brought suit against enti-
ties and individuals acting within the current laws. See id. For example, all parties
engaged in the creation of the iPod could potentially have been held liable: Apple
Computer for inventing the iPod, Toshiba for creating the hard drive for the iPod,
and CNET for posting information on how to transfer and save iPod's music files.
See id.
19. SeeJESSIcA LIT mAN, DIGrrAL COPYRIGHT 23 (Promethus Books 2001) (elab-
orating on art of making copyright laws).
20. See id. (discussing Congress's encouragement of people affected by copy-
right law to "hash out" changes to be made amongst themselves).
[Vol. 13: p. 271
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fives are at the forefront, interjecting their ideas into such revisions,
crafted with their own, individual agendas in mind.2'
Currently, strong areas of disagreement remain on major is-
sues among the publishers, record labels, digital delivery entities,
and recording artists. The areas of contention primarily include: 1)
the payment of mechanical royalties plus public performance royal-
ties to copyrights holders (what the digital delivery industry repre-
sentatives refer to as "double-dipping"); 2) the nonpayment or
underpayment of royalties to recording artists for such digital deliv-
eries; 3) the lack of payment for the analog public performance of
sound recordings; 4) the complexities and inequalities associated
with small webcasters' rights and obligations to copyright holders;
and 5) the frustration of digital content delivery services ("DCDS")
with regards to the complex matrix of licensing procedures.
These DCDSs uniformly contend they are caught in the stran-
glehold of the oligopoly held by the major labels, those who control
the rights to the majority of sound recordings released globally.22
The DCDSs argue that the fact that they must receive individual
mechanical licenses for every song, in addition to licenses for every
sound recording for their reproduction and distribution, hurts all
the participants. They argue further that this system obscures copy-
right law's primary tenet of promoting the public welfare by creat-
21. See id. (discussing power of multiparty negotiators over Congress); see also
HEARING, supra note 15, at 19-21 (providing oversight testimony of Jonathan Pot-
ter, Executive Director, Digital Media Association). Potter testified on behalf of
the online music industry and the Digital Media Association "regarding certain
amendments to the Copyright Act that will trigger extraordinary growth in legiti-
mate royalty-paying online music and a concomitant reduction in piracy." HEAR-
ING, supra note 15, at 21.
22. See Electronic Frontier Foundation: Intellectual Property: Creative Free-
doms, http://www.eff.org/IP/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2006) (stating theory underly-
ing copyright law).
The idea of copyright law is that, after a time, every work comes back
into the hands of the public, where it can be reused, recycled, and made
part of new creativity without the artist having to pay a fee or call in the
lawyers. Yet some copyright holders act as though copyright is both per-
manent and boundless, pressing claims that threaten even traditionally
protected activities like making a parody. These claims strip-mine the
public domain, robbing the next generation of artists of rich source
materials for creativity.
Id.; see also Press Release, Digital Media Association, DiMA Seeks Competitive Roy-
alty Rates for Internet Radio (Oct. 31, 2005), available at http://www.digmedia.
org/docs/Press%20Release%2010-31-05.pdf (discussing royalty payments). The
Digital Media Association ("DiMA") has called for a reduction in digital public
performance royalty payment rates to recording artists and sound recording own-
ers from the Copyright Royalty Board. See id. Theoretically, this would create an
atmosphere of fairness, a leveling of the playing field, between small webcasters,
i.e., new entrants into the world of Internet broadcasting, and larger Internet radio
conglomerates, who can afford larger sums.
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ing incentives for authors to create original works and making
those works available to the public.23
In order to facilitate this exchange, which constitutes the core
principle of the Act,24 the Act must undergo five revisions. The first
section in the Act that must be scrutinized is Section 106,25 which
describes the rights afforded to copyright registrants of original
works of authorship. Second, Section 114,26 which describes the
23. See HEARING, supra note 15, at 11-13 (discussing music industry's current
problems with copyright law). In a recent survey about the lack of substantial suc-
cess in today's music industry, senior executives at RealNetworks, Napster, and
Sony, three prominent online music services, cited the "difficulties associated with
music publishing rights as their single biggest business problem," not piracy. Id. at
22; see also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("'The copyright law.., makes
reward to the owner a secondary consideration.' However, it is 'intended defi-
nitely to grant valuable enforceable rights to authors, publishers, etc., without bur-
densome requirements; 'to afford greater encouragement to the production of
literary [or artistic] works of lasting benefit to the world."" (alteration in original)
(citations omitted)).
24. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948)
(stating core principles of Act). "The copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes
reward to the owner a secondary consideration." Id.
25. See Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2005) (articulating this integral provi-
sion of Act). Copyright owners have the exclusive rights to "do and to authorize"
the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to
perform the copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including
the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work,
to display the copyrighted work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.
Id.
26. Copyright Act § 114 (affording several rights to sound recording copy-
right owners). Those rights include the right to reproduce the work in pho-
norecords or copies, to prepare derivative works, to distribute copies publicly by
sale or other ownership transfer, and to perform the work publicly by a digital
audio transmission. See id. § 114(a) (referencing §§ 106(1) - (3), (6)). However,
a sound recording copyright owner is limited to rights in duplication and distribu-
tion of the sound recording only. See id. § 114(b). No rights under the Act for
sound recording copyright owners existed prior to 1972. The Digital Performance
Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995 amended section 114 as follows: 1) in sub-
section (a), by replacing "and (3)" with "(3) and (6);" 2) in subsection (b) in the
first sentence, by replacing "phonorecords, or of copies of motion pictures and
other audiovisual works," with "phonorecords or copies;" and 3) by replacing sub-
section (d) with new subsections (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), and (j). See Pub. L. No.
104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995). In 1997, subsection 114(f) was amended. See Title 17
Technical Amendments, Pub. L. No. 105-80, 111 Stat. 1529, 1531 (1997).
[Vol. 13: p. 271
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rights afforded to sound recording copyright owners, is the next
section that needs to be revised. The third necessary revision is to
Section 115,27 which describes the compulsory mechanical license.
A fourth revision is needed for the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act of 1998.28 The fifth and last revision should be to the Small
Webcasters Settlement Act of 2002.29 At this juncture, it is essential
that Congress allow the public to partake in the enormous variety of
music being created everyday. It would be anomalous to have the
power of technology readily available to creators, easing the process
of creation, yet have their creations stored in the digital basement,
never to be heard.
In 1998, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act amended section 114(d) by
replacing paragraphs (1)(A) and (2) with amendments in the nature of substi-
tutes. SeePub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860, 2890 (1998). That Act also amended
section 114(f) by revising the tide, redesignating paragraph (1) as paragraph
(1)(A), adding paragraph (1)(B) in lieu of paragraphs (2), (3), (4), and (5), and
amending the language in newly designated paragraph (1) (A), including revising
the effective date from December 31, 2000, to December 31, 2001. See id. at 2894.
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act also amended subsection 114(g) by
striking "subscription transmission," and in the first sentence in paragraph (g) (1),
by substituting "subscription transmission licensed" with "transmission licensed
under a statutory license." See id. at 2897. That Act also amended subsection
114(j) by redesignating paragraphs (2), (3), (5), (6), (7), and (8) as (3), (5), (9),
(12), (13), and (14), respectively; by amending paragraphs (4) and (9); and by
adding new definitions, including, paragraph (2) defining "archived program,"
paragraph (4) defining "continuous program," paragraph (6) defining "eligible
nonsubscription transmission," paragraph (8) defining "new subscription service,"
paragraph (10) defining "preexisting satellite digital audio radio service," and par-
agraph (11) defining "preexisting subscription service." See id. at 2897-99.
The Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002 amended section 114 by adding
paragraph (5) to subsection 114(f) and by amending paragraph 11 4 (g)(2). See
Pub. L. No. 107-321, 116 Stat. 2780, 2781, 2784 (2002) (providing Small Webcaster
Settlement Act of 2002).
27. See Copyright Act § 115 (detailing distribution and performance rights).
The copyright owner's rights to distribute and perform her copyrighted work must
comply with Section 115's compulsory license scheme. See id. This license scheme
requires anyone wishing to obtain such a license to provide a notice of intention to
the copyright owner. See id.
28. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"), Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112
Stat. 2860 (1998) (providing text of Digital Millennium Copyright Act). Among
the DMCA's most controversial provisions is Section 1201 (17 U.S.C. § 1201). Ac-
cording to Jonathan Band of Morrison & Foerster, Section 1201 "prohibits gaining
unauthorized access to a work by circumventing a technological protection mea-
sure put in place by the copyright owner where such protection measure otherwise
effectively controls access to a copyrighted work." Jonathan Band, The Digital Mil-
lennium Copyright Act, Aug. 16, 2001, http://www.arl.org/info/frn/copy/band.
html. The DMCA also permits copyright owners to compel Internet service provid-
ers ("ISPs") to remove material from the Internet and the web when the copyright
owner believes the material is infringing. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2005) (pending
legislation H.R. 4536, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005) (emphasizing extent of Section
1201's enforcement and alluding to potentially affected parties).
29. See Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-321, 116 Stat.
2780 (2002) (amending Title 17 specifically statutory license for webcasting).
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Section 106 of the Act 30 sets forth the six exclusive rights held
by authors or creators of original works; the music industry finds
the following five relevant: reproduction, distribution, public per-
formance, creation of a derivative work, and the digital public per-
formance in a sound recording. 31 Each exclusive right has
exceptions or limitations attached to it.32 While Section 114 33 sets
forth exclusive rights held by sound recording copyright owners,
Section 11534 provides the parameters of the compulsory mechani-
cal license.
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF SECTION 115 OF THE ACT
In 1831, Congress added musical compositions to the catego-
ries of copyrightable works. 35 Musical work copyright owners were
30. See Copyright Act § 106 (setting forth rights implicit in holding
copyright).
31. See id. (listing rights including right of display which is not at issue here).
32. See id. §§ 107-22 (providing exceptions and limitations to rights). There
exists in the Copyright Act one provision stating the copyright holder's exclusive
rights. See id. § 106. The next sixteen sections delineate the scope, exceptions,
and limitations on those stated rights. Recently, Section 115 has been the subject
of much discussion and scrutiny. For example, Mary Beth Peters, the U.S. Register
of Copyrights, recently mentioned this section in her testimony before the United
States Senate Committee on the Judiciary on September 28, 2005. Peters stated,
Section 115 of the Copyright Act governs the compulsory licensing of
the reproduction and distribution rights for nondramatic musical works
by means of physical phonorecords and digital phonorecord deliveries.
However, it has rarely been used as a functioning compulsory license,
serving rather as a ceiling on the royalty rate in privately negotiated li-
censes and thereby placing artificial limits on the free marketplace.
Moreover, its "one-at-a-time" structure for licensing individual musical
works is incompatible with online music services' need to acquire the
right to make vast numbers of already-recorded phonorecords available
to consumers. Moreover, many online activities involve both the public
performance right and the rights of reproduction and distribution, rights
that usually are controlled by separate sets of middlemen in the case of
musical compositions, but not in the case of sound recordings. The ex-
isting system is characterized by tremendous impediments to efficient
and effective licensing of the rights needed by a contemporary online
music service. Reform is needed to make it possible to clear quickly and
efficiently the necessary exclusive rights for large numbers of works.
Protecting Copyright and Innovation in a Post-Grokster World: Hearings Before United
States Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005), available at http://judiciary.
senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id1634&witid=4682 (providing testimony of Marybeth
Peters in reference to recent Supreme Court decision in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Stu-
dios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005)).
33. See Copyright Act § 114 (setting forth exclusive rights in sound
recordings).
34. See id. § 115 (setting forth license availability and requirements relevant to
copyrights).
35. See Julie B. Raines, The Fairness in Musical Licensing Act: The Tavern Bill
Casts a Shadow, 20 HAsTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 169, 174 (1997) (discussing Copy-
[Vol. 13: p. 271
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granted the same rights as any other copyright owner, "the sole
right and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing, and vending"
the copyrighted work.36 For musical works, this was almost exclu-
sively achieved through the sale of sheet music.
At this time, three major interested parties in the copyrighted
musical works existed. First, there were the composers, who were
the authors of the musical compositions to whom the Copyright Act
granted copyright protection. The second interested parties were
the music publishers; they purchased the copyrights from the com-
posers, either for a lump sum or for continuing royalty payments.
Once the publishers gained control of the composers' copyrights,
they had the authority to exercise the rights of the copyright owner.
Third, there was the consumer, who paid to own a copy of the musi-
cal composition in the form of sheet music. The consumer could
then take the sheet music home, learn the song, and perform it.
The interests of the third group, the general public, were possi-
bly the most important rights copyright law implicated. It was the
consuming public that actually listened to the music or learned to
perform it. However, in the 1800s, public performances of sheet
music did not have any implications on the rights of the copyright-
holders (i.e., the publishers).3 7
This symbiotic triumvirate among the authors/composers,
publishers/distributors, and consumers remained in effect for sev-
eral decades, mirroring the print and book industries. Rights be-
gan to change when the Copyright Act of 1909 added the right to
"arrange or adapt."38 In addition to the rights of printing and
vending the musical composition in sheet music, music publishers,
as transferees of the composers' copyrights, now controlled the
making of adaptations to that musical work. There was one major
exception: the 1909 Act subjected the right to control the creation
right Act's congressional origin); see also Copyright Act of 1790, Act of May 31,
1790, 1 Stat. 124 [hereinafter Copyright Act of 1790] (providing Act as imple-
mented by First Congress). For a discussion of the history of the Act, see supra
note 11 and accompanying text. In 1790, protection was offered only for books,
maps, and charts. In 1831, the Act was amended to include protection for musical
works.
36. Copyright Act of 1790, § 1; see Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349,
ch. 1, § 1(a), 35 Stat. 1075, 1077-78 (1909) [hereinafter Copyright Act of 1909]
(incorporating similar language from 1790 Act).
37. Compare Copyright Act of 1790 (lacking right of public performance), with
Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 1, § 1 (c) (containing right of public performance).
The right of public performance was not implicated because it did not exist under
federal copyright law until the enactment of the 1909 Copyright Act.
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and distribution of "mechanical" copies to a compulsory license.3 9
The compulsory license became one of the most significant factors
affecting the modern structure of the music industry. Unfortu-
nately, this development also became the main source of complica-
tions within the industry.
In response to the player piano industry and the Supreme
Court's opinion in White-Smith Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.,40 the legal
landscape concerning music copyrights started to become complex
with respect to the 1909 Act. In that case, the Supreme Court de-
termined that player piano rolls did not constitute reproductions of
musical compositions, and therefore, they were not infringing upon
the copyright owners' rights in those compositions. 41 Player piano
rolls were made without copying the actual notes on staff paper, but
instead, they were made by having perforations in the rolls that
mechanically caused notes to be played on the piano as the rolls
rotated. 42 In White-Smith, the Court ruled that these rolls were not
"copies" of the copyrighted musical composition, but were compo-
nent parts of machines. 43 Therefore, no copyright infringement
existed. 44
The result in White-Smith was overturned by the 1909 Act, which
granted musical work copyright owners the right to control the
"mechanical reproduction" of their works. This explicitly impli-
cated the player piano rolls as infringements of the musical compo-
sition copyright.45 One piano roll company, the Aeolian Company,
39. See id. § I(e) (detailing exception to compulsory licenses).
40. 209 U.S. 1, 13 (1908) (concluding that under then-existing Copyright Act,
producers and performers did not have exclusive right to their respective sound
recordings). At issue in this case was whether a mechanical machine that repro-
duced the sounds of copyrighted musical works constituted infringement. See id. at
14.
41. See id. at 12 (analogizing to facts and questions of Kennedy v. McTammany,
33 F. 584, 584 (C. C. Mass. 1888), appeal denied, 145 U.S. 643 (1892)). Specifically,
the White-Smith Court considered what Judge Colt in Kennedy questioned: whether
"perforated strips of paper were copies of sheet music within the meaning of the
copyright law." Id. The White-Smith Court further relied on Judge Colt's opinion:
"They are a mechanical invention made for the sole purpose of performing tunes
mechanically upon a musical instrument." Id. (quoting Kennedy, 33 F. at 584).
42. See id. at 14-15 (noting that player piano rolls are essentially different from
sheet music).
43. See id. (acknowledging that player piano rolls were perforated strips of
paper that formed part of machine).
44. See id. at 18 (holding that perforated rolls operated in connection with
mechanical devices for production of music falls outside copyright act).
45. See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 1, § 1 (e) (enacting legislation to curb copy-
right infringement through mechanical means).
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had enormous market power. 46 It engaged in the practice of
hoarding and monopolizing compositions and refused to allow
other competing companies to reproduce their songs in piano rolls
or otherwise. 47 Congress responded to this monopolization of cop-
yright compositions by creating the compulsory mechanical license.
This newly-developed licensing construct, that utilized the
mechanical license, permitted any manufacturer of piano rolls to
use any musical composition without negotiating with the copyright
owner for permission, as long as: (1) the musical work had been
previously licensed to someone else for mechanical reproduction,
and (2) the manufacturer paid a statutory royalty of two cents.48
Thus, once a piano roll company, like the Aeolian Company, had
negotiated the right to reproduce a musical composition in
"mechanical reproductions," anyone else, upon payment of the stat-
utory royalty, could also produce piano rolls of such musical com-
positions.49 In essence, the law made it impossible for large
companies to monopolize mechanical reproduction by stipulating
that once copyright owners had granted permission for the first re-
cording of their song, any other person could record that song by
simply paying a fee.
The mechanical license construct and the mechanical license
fee structure were carried over into the Act's most recent incarna-
tion, Section 115.50 The compulsory license has provided the basic
framework for the relationship between the recording and music
publishing industries since its inception. Section 115, however, re-
quires copyright users to license every individual work by following
cumbersome notice and accounting procedures. 51
46. See The Grand Piano Series: A Technical Outline of the Reproducing Piano, 1 2,
http://www.wyastone.co.uk/nrl/gp_tech.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2006) (report-
ing that "[b]etween 1915 and 1930 the Reproducing Piano was very big business").
In its peak year, 1925, more than 192,000 domestic instruments were
manufactured by the Aeolian Company in the USA, with a total sales
value of $59,000,000. The Aeolian Company made every effort to perfect
and enhance their invention, and throughout this period they kept the
most famous pianists under contract; offering a balanced repertoire of
smaller pieces, and, most significantly for us, larger works which the 78
rpm disc could not manage.
Id. (discussing vast market power of Aeolian Company in early 1900s).
47. See id. (inferring textual statement through fact that Aeolian Company
kept most famous pianists under contract).
48. See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 1, § 1 (e) (setting out newly developed li-
censing construct).
49. See id. (preventing monopolization of mechanical reproduction of musical
compositions).
50. See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2004) (setting forth licensing structure).
51. See id. § (b), (c) (detailing notice and accounting procedures).
285
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The regulations currently provide more difficult procedures
for reporting usage information. Because the official procedures
are onerously burdensome, the marketplace reacted by birthing en-
tities like the Harry Fox Agency.5 2 Today, however, new technology
has caused Section 115 to impede the public's access to copyrighted
works.
III. RIGHTS IMPLICATED BY THE NEW DIGITAL BUSINESS MODELS
The number and variety of digital music delivery services have
mushroomed over the last several years. 53 To maintain market-
place viability and appeal, the business models of these "content
movers" require rapid delivery, easy interoperability with existing
content sending/receiving devices (such as standalone MP3 play-
ers, iPods®, and cellular phones), and an ever-growing library of
millions of works to be made available to consumers.
Some digital content delivery services ("DCDS"), such as Nap-
ster.com, are interactive. 54 For a monthly subscription fee, consum-
ers are able to create their own "digital jukebox" and place the
songs they desire for future listening on their computers and/or
portable devices. While this activity is commonly referred to as
52. See HFA ("Harry Fox Agency"), 1, www.harryfox.com/public/HFA
Home.jsp (last visited Mar. 2, 2006) (announcing Harry Fox Agency is primary
mechanical licensing, collection, and mechanical royalty distribution agency).
The Agency was established in 1927 by the National Music Publisher's Association.
See id. 1 2; see also Montez Simmons, Music Publishing Essentials: The Harry Fox
Agency, http://www.musicianassist.com/archive/article/ART/a-0798-1.htm (last
visited Mar. 2, 2006) (explaining services provided by Harry Fox Agency).
53. See, e.g., Recording Industry Association of America, http://www.riaa.
com/issues/music/legalsites.asp (last visited Mar. 2, 2006) (listing numerous legal
download websites). iTunes®, which entered the market in April 2003, single-
handedly jump-started the digital content delivery service industry. See Apple
-iPod + iTunes, http://www.apple.com/itunes/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2006) (display-
ing device).
54. See, e.g., Napster, http://www.napster.com/more-about-napster.html (last
visited Mar. 2, 2006) (offering consumers catalog of over one million songs from
which to choose for monthly subscription fee of only $9.95); Rhapsody, http://
www.real.com/rhapsody/info.html?src=rcom-menuunlimited (follow "Music
Sharing" icon; then follow "Offer Terms" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 2, 2006)
(offering over 1.3 million selections for monthly subscription fee of $9.99). It is
important to note that, if a subscriber ceases her subscription to these services, she
will no longer have access to any of the recordings she has previously downloaded;
therefore, the subscriber is "renting" the recordings as long as she pays for the
subscription. See Rhapsody, supra (detailing usage conditions in Terms of Service).
Of course, the subscriber also has the opportunity to purchase the recordings for
an additional fee. See id.
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"downloading,"55 others are non-interactive, such as Internet radio
stations. These services merely perform music and have a passive
listenership, known as "streaming. '56 In the former case, the music
purchased may be permanent (as in the case of purchases from
iTunes®); in the latter case, the music may be "tethered" (i.e., lim-
ited or impermanent), whereby music consumers may only retain
the ability to listen to the songs as long as they maintain their sub-
scription to that service. The lines between downloading and
streaming, however, are rapidly disappearing as new software de-
vices, such as iRadio® and iFill®, as well as new hardware devices
emerge. Although these devices claim to focus on their streaming
capabilities, in reality, their activities result in permanent
downloads. Both types of DCDSs implicate certain rights under the
Copyright Act. In each recording, two separate copyrightable ele-
ments are present: (1) the underlying musical composition (the
song) ,5 and (2) the sound recording, which encompasses the ac-
55. See Wikipedia: Uploading and Downloading, http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Downloading (last visited Mar. 2, 2006) (defining downloading). The terms
are defined as follows:
Uploading and downloading are related terms used to describe the
transfer of electronic data between two systems or similar devices. Their
primary usage is as a verb: to upload is to send data from a local system to
some remote system, such as a website, File Transfer Protocol (FTP)
server, or other similar system. To download is to receive data from a re-
mote system.
In general use, the terms do not refer to the basic communication
required for the operation of the software including connecting to an
FTP server or requesting and receiving data displayed in a web browser.
Instead, they are reserved for the specific and intentional act of transfer-
ring a file.
By extension, the terms can be used as nouns. In this context, an
upload is any file that has been uploaded, particularly if it is awaiting the
recipient's attention. A download is any file that is offered for download-
ing or that has been downloaded.
Id.
56. See Webopedia: Streaming, http://www.pcwebopaedia.com/TERM/s/
streaming.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2006) (indicating this activity is commonly re-
ferred to as "streaming"). Through the process of streaming, data is transferred in
a way that enables processing at a continuous and steady flow. See id. As the In-
ternet and its capabilities continue to expand, users are often unable to maintain
fast enough access to download large media files rapidly. See id. Thus, streaming is
becoming more important because it allows a user's browser to begin "displaying
[some] data before the entire file has been transmitted." Id.
57. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2) (1990) (indicating that "songs" are referred to
in Copyright Act as "musical works, including any accompanying words"). The
term "song" is not precisely defined under the terms of the Copyright Act. See id.
Compositions consist of words and music, or sometimes, just music. Compositions
are also known as "non-dramatic musical works" in order to distinguish them from
"dramatic works, including any accompanying music." See id. Compare 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(a) (2) (referring to non-dramatic musical works), with 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (3)
(illustrating classification of compositions as "dramatic" musical works).
287
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tual, fixed sounds embodied in the recording (the "tracks" of the
recording).58 To illustrate this further, consider Table I below.
TABLE I. RIGHTS IMPLICATED IN DIGITAL Music DELIVERY SYSTEMS
DIGITAL PUBLIC DERIVATIVE
REPRODUCTION DISTRIBUTION PERFORMANCE WORK
Downloading: Permanent Song: Yes Song: Yes Song: Yes Song: No
Sound Recording SR Yes SR: Yes SR. No
(SR): Yes
Downloading: Tethered Song: Yes, but Song: Unk. Song: Yes Song: No
ephemeral SR: Unk. SR: Yes SR: No
SR. Yes, but
ephemeral
Streaming (radio sta- Song: No Song: No Song: Yes Song: No
tions) SR. No SR. No SR: Yes SR: No
Streaming clips (over Song: No Song: No Song: Yes Song: Yes
iTunes-type services) SR- No SR: No SR. Yes SR, Yes
iFill-type software Song: Yes Song: Yes Song: Yes Song: No*
SR Yes SR Yes SR: Yes SR. No*
iRadio-type software Song: Yes Song: Yes Song: Yes Song: No*
SR: Yes SR Yes SR: Yes SR: No*
Cell Phone (beaming Beaming. Beaming: Beaming: Beaming:
songs and listening to Song: Yes Song: Yes Song: N/A Song: No*
songs) SR. Yes SR Yes SR: N/A SR: No*
Listening. Listening: Listening. Listening:
Song: No Song: No Song: Yes Song: No
SR. No SR- No SR: Yes SR: No
**Instant Messaging Song: Yes Song: Yes Song: N/A Song: No*
SR: Yes SR: Yes SR: N/A SR: No*
Ringtones Song: Yes Song: Yes Song: Yes Song: Yes
SR: Yes*** SR: Yes*** SR Yes SR Yes
Podcasts Song: Yes Song: Yes Song: Yes Song: No*
SR. Yes SR. Yes SR Yes SR No*
*This depends gn whether the radio station(s) or songs that are downloaded (transferred) engage in
playing samples 9 or "mashups."6 0 Alternatively, in the case of podcasts, they are intentionally altered to
fit the podcast program, which includes theme music, intros, and outros.
58. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2005) (defining "sound recordings" as "works that
result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds, but not
including the sounds accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work,
regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as disks, tapes, or other pho-
norecords, in which they are embodied").
59. See Wikipedia: Sampling, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sampling_%28
music%29 (last visited Mar. 2, 2006) (indicating that sample is portion of record-
ing lifted (or edited) from sound recording and inserted, sometimes repeatedly,
within body of new and different sound recording to create new work). A sample
consists of two copyrightable elements, the song or music and the sound record-
ing; therefore, two separate licenses must be obtained from the respective copy-
right owners for each sample used in order to insert the sample into the new
recording. See id. (follow "Legal Issues" hyperlink). Often times, if the sample is
derived from a popular recording, the publisher of the sampled song or owner of
the sampled sound recording demand copyright ownership rights in the new re-
cording as partial consideration for allowing the sampler's use of their song and
sound recording in such new recording. See id.
60. See Sasha Frere-Jones, 1+1+1=1: The New Math of Mashups, THE NEW
YORKER, Jan. 10, 2005, at 85, available at http://www.newyorker.com/critics/mu-
18
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**Instant Messaging ("IM") services, 6 1 such as AOL Instant Messenger@, facilitate transfer of recorded
music to others via their services; it is the consumer, however, not the service that engages in this activity.
Therefore, IM services are not considered Interactive DCDSs ("InDCDSs) for purposes of this Article.
Only if Ringtone 6 2 is a True tone, 6 3 i.e., an excerpt from the original sound recording.
The most common types of Interactive DCDSs ("InDCDS")
are:
" Digital Subscription Services, such as the new Nap-
ster.com, which offer tethered downloads;
* Podcasts, which are radio-style programs which are
archived on a website, such as iTunes®, and available
for downloading;
* Digital Non-Subscription Services, such as iTunes®,
which offer individual permanent downloads (NOTE:
sic/?050110crmvmusic (illustrating implications of rights attributable to samples
and mashups). As a result, many separate rights are implicated. For example,
"Collision Course," a legally sanctioned record of mashups, contains a combina-
tion of the music of Linkin Park and material from Jay-Z's "The Black Album" and
other albums. See id. 6. One of Jay-Z's songs used on the record has four pub-
lishers and two samples. See id. 7. Therefore, in order to properly record and
distribute "Collision Course" under the Copyright Act, the label issuing the
mashup needed to obtain permission from the owner of each sample and each
publisher (at least six parties), before Linkin Park's music was even added, which
could have infinite publishers on its own. See id. Unless the issuing label can con-
vince each publisher to accept a reduced royalty rate, it will likely be unprofitable
for the label to put out such a creation. See id. Thus, as labels are less likely to
gamble on a mashup of lesser-known artists, fearing that they will not sell enough
records to make a profit, creativity becomes stifled. See id.
61. See Wikipedia: Instant Messaging, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant-
messaging (last visited Mar. 2, 2006) (defining "instant messaging"). Instant Mes-
saging is a service offered by AOL® to its subscribers and non-subscribers, which
allows two or more people to instantly communicate by sending typewritten
messages in "pop-up" style windows that appear on one's computer desktop. See id.
This type of communication is an online "posting" of messages over a network,
such as AOL®, for example, which continues back and forth in real time over the
Internet. See id.
62. See PCMag.com: Definition of Ringtone, http://www.pcmag.com/encyclo-
pediajterm/0,2542,t=ringtone&i=50543,00.asp (last visited Mar. 2, 2006) (defining
"ringtone" as sound telephone makes when incoming call). Traditionally, the av-
erage ringtone was in the 440-480 Hz range, but today, most cell phones can sup-
port a wide differentiation and frequency range, which enables them to play
"several bars of music." Id. 1. Ringtones use several formats, including MP3,
which supports music and voice, and MIDI and Nokia's RTY[L (Ringing Tones
Text Transfer Language), which support music. See id. 2. As ringtones have
become increasingly popular, many cellphones now come with "a selection of
built-in ringtones" and are able to accept new ones from ringtone services. Id. 1.
In some phones and formats, ringtones can also be transferred through text
messages (SMS). See id. 1 2.
63. See Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ringtone (follow "1.3 Music
ringtones" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 2, 2006) (defining "truetone" as new ad-
vanced ringtone). A "true tone" or "trutone" is a ringtone that is a short (approxi-
mately thirty-second) music clip edited directly from an original sound recording
and made available to consumers for downloading onto their cell phones to re-
present their own, recognizable cell phone ring. See id.
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iTunes® also streams recorded music clips for consum-
ers to review before purchasing); and
* Ringtone 64 and True tone6 5 providers, also referred to
as "aggregators".
Every time a consumer streams and downloads a recording
over the Internet from an InDCDS, the following occurs: (1) the
InDCDS engages in a public performance of both the song and the
sound recording; (2) the consumer makes a reproduction of both
the song and the sound recording via the InDCDS delivery; and (3)
the InDCDS distributes to the consumer both the song and the
sound recording. Arguably, however, tethered downloads are
merely ephemeral, 66 and therefore, do not constitute a reproduc-
tion or a distribution.67
This scenario is further complicated by InDCDS' streaming of
"music clips," approximately thirty seconds of a song, on their web-
sites for consumer review. According to the recording industry, this
results in the creation of a derivative work. The music clip is a de-
rivative work because the underlying nature of the original work
was altered. 68 Therefore, in order to comply with current copyright
laws, the InDCDS is required to obtain permission for each deriva-
tive work, which involves fees to the copyright owner.69
When a non-interactive DCDS ("NDCDS"), such as an Internet
radio station or webcaster, streams a recording over the Internet,
public performance rights for both the song and the sound record-
ing are implicated. The NDCDS must not only gain permission for
the broadcast of these recordings, but also comply with the "sound
recording complement. ' 70 Compliance makes the NDCDS eligible
64. See id. (explaining that ringtone is recreated from original sound record-
ing, but does not utilize such sound recording). The copyright owner must issue a
license to the user for their reproduction and distribution (mechanical rights). See
id. Downloading ringtones may also implicate public performance and the right to
create a derivative work as well. See id.
65. See id. (explaining and comparing ringtones to true tones).
66. See 17 U.S.C. § 112 (2004) (discussing limitations on exclusive rights and
ephemeral recordings).
67. For a further discussion and illustration of InDCDSs involvement, see
supra Table I.
68. See generally Eriq Gardner, Shake, Rattle and R-R-Ring: Disputes over Faddish
New Ringtones - and Billions in Licensing Money - Mean Turmoil in the Music Industry,
5 CORP. COUNS. 90 (Aug. 2005) (discussing implications of copyright act on
ringtones industry).
69. For an illustration of the fees, see infra Table II.
70. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860,
2891 (1998) (detailing sound recording performance requirement). Under the
sound recording performance complement, a webcaster may not play in any three-
[Vol. 13: p. 271
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for a statutory license. 7 1 In effect, this compliance avoids the need
to negotiate every sound recording's digital public performance li-
cense with every sound recording owner, normally the record label.
The rules set forth in the "sound recording complement" are at
best unwieldy, and at worst, thwart the intent and nature of copy-
right law. Today, they may even be moot.72
Congress's likely intent in creating the "sound recording com-
plement" was to discourage illegal downloading of music from In-
ternet radio stations. Music streamed over an Internet radio station
is in digital form, as opposed to analog form; therefore, if a listener
wants to download a song from such a station onto an MP3 player,
there will be little or no sonic generational loss. In other words, the
reproduced song on an individual's MP3 player will sound nearly as
good as the original song embodied on a CD.
The "sound recording performance complement" rules inhibit
a listener's ability to reproduce songs by imposing fourteen compli-
cated rules on Internet broadcasters. 73 The broadcaster must com-
ply with these rules to be eligible for the DMCA's compulsory
statutory license for the use of sound recordings.74 These rules
have become archaic because they are burdensome to enforce, dif-
ficult for small webcasters and podcasters to comply with, and can
be expensive for fledgling webcasters.7 5 Moreover, they are rapidly
hour period more than three songs from the same album, or four songs from a
particular artist or a boxed set. See RIAA: Frequently Asked Questions - Webcast-
ing, http://www.riaa.com/issues/licensing/webcasting-faq.asp (follow "What are
the conditions a webcaster has to meet in order to qualify for the statutory li-
censes?" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 2, 2006) (explaining sound recording per-
formance complement). For a further discussion of the sound recording
complement, see infra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
71. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 112 Stat. at 2890-91 (detailing re-
quirements for statutory license). To qualify for a statutory license, the webcaster
must (1) pay royalties, (2) abide by the sound recording performance comple-
ment, (3) not make prior announcements of songs to be played, (4) limit archived
programming, (5) limit looped programming, (6) limit repeat of programs, (7)
identify song, artist, and album, (8) not make false suggestions linking song and
advertising, (9) defeat copying by recipient, (10) accommodate technical protec-
tion measures, (11) defeat scanning, (12) not transmit bootlegs, (13) not switch
channels, and (14) transmit copyright management information. See RIAA: Fre-
quently Asked Questions - Webcasting, sup-a note 70.
72. For a further discussion of this provision's mootness, see infra notes 76-77
and accompanying text.
73. See RIAA: Frequently Asked Questions - Webcasting, supra note 70 (detail-
ing requirements on broadcasters).
74. See id. (stating rules to be followed in order to obtain license).
75. See, e.g., Live365, www.live365.com (last visited Mar. 2, 2006) (pronounc-
ing it as "the world's largest Internet radio network" hosts thousands of fledgling
Internet radio stations); Sound Exchange, www.soundexchange.com (search
"Live365"; then follow "Notice of Intent to Audit Live365.com" hyperlink) (last
21
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becoming moot, based on a number of factors, particularly: (1) re-
ports that many independent recording artists willingly waived their
rights in order to allow small webcasters and music websites to pub-
licly perform their sound recordings to exploit the inherent promo-
tional value;76 and (2) the introduction into the marketplace of
new technology which completely bypassed any sort of royalty pay-
ment structures or licensing procedures. 77
To summarize, compliance with the Act requires InDCDSs and
NDCDSs to adhere to strict accounting procedures, and maintain
comprehensive databases and licenses with a convoluted constella-
tion of entities. This process is prohibitively expensive and burden-
some. A cursory review of Table II reveals for InDCDSs, DCDSs,
and other types of digital delivery, the licensing complexities in-
volved ignore technological realities. To illustrate further, consider
visited Mar. 2, 2006) (noting actions taken by Live365). In December 2005, many
embryonic Internet radio stations, who had barely begun to accrue any revenue,
received notice from Live365 that the network, along with its hosted radio stations,
was being audited by SoundExchange, the collection agency for digital public per-
formance rights royalties for sound recordings, to ensure that proper payments
were being made. See Sound Exchange, supra.
Moreover, the RIAA has continued to crack-down on Internet radio services,
like Live365, to ensure and force compliance with the Digital Millennium Copy-
right Act. See RIAA Looks At Live365 DMCA Compliance, Nov. 28, 2005, http://
www.fmqb.com/Article.asp?t=P&id=148481. Users of Live365 "recently received
an email stating, 'The RIAA has been in touch with us recently to let us know that
they have found a number of stations that are not compliant on the service. If
stations continue to operate out of compliance, we will reserve the right to shut
them down or otherwise restrict access.'" Id.
76. See, e.g., Myspace, www.myspace.com (last visited Apr. 27, 2006) (permit-
ting many independent recording artists to share music with others for free); Pure
volume, www.purevolume.com (last visited Apr. 27, 2006) (allowing many indepen-
dent recording artists to post their music for free downloading).
77. See, e.g., iFill - Griffin Technology, supra note 16 (displaying new device
touted as "a great fit for your active lifestyle"). The iFill website boasts the
following:
iFill Music from thousands of radio. streams.
iFill streams mp3 files from thousands of free radio stations directly to
your iPod. You can choose several stations at once and select from many
different genres. And since iFill goes directly to your iPod, it won't clut-
ter up your hard drive with extra files.
iFill 'er Up!
iFill is a great fit for your active lifestyle. With iFill, you can go to bed
while charging your iPod, and wake up to an iPod full of new music, ready
to go jogging with you, and without having to search through your record collec-
tion, browse the iTunes Store, or rip any CDs.
Using iFill is easy.
1. Open iFill
2. Select your radio stations (you can select more than one!)
3. Click Record
Done! Fresh music starts streaming to your iPod.
Id. (emphasis added) (noting additionally that iFill device costs only $19.99).
[Vol. 13: p. 271
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the following story of Peggy, discussed in Section IV. Unfortu-
nately, our prototypical example, Peggy, was faced with such com-
plexities, as are many other prospective consumers, and easily could
have fallen victim to the perplexing pitfalls under the current Copy-
right Act.
TABLE II. TABLE OF CuRRENT RIGHTS AND LICENSES* 7 8
* Note Ringtone licensees are required to obtain separate Ringtone licenses7 9 from the copyright owners of the




PUBLIC DERIVATIVE IN SOUND
Types of Rights REPRODUCTION DISTRIBUTION PERFORMANCE WORK RECORDING
License Needed -First Use: NML -First Use: NML PP License via Negotiated N/A (digital PP
for Composi- -After First Use: -After First Use: PRO License rights for Corn-
ion CML CML positions licen-
sed via PRO)
License Needed NML NML No license Negotiated PP License via
for Sound re- required for License Digital PRO, i.e.,
cording terrestrial, i.e., SoundExchange
analog, PP
Who gets paid Publisher(s), i.e., Publisher(s), Publisher (and Publisher(s) Publisher(s)
for the Compo- Copyright i.e., Copyright Composer, if
sition Owner(s) Owner(s) they are differ-
ent parties)
Who gets paid Copyright Owner, Copyright N/A Record Record Label,
for the Sound i.e., generally, Owner, i.e., Label Featured
Recording Record Label; generally, Recording Art-
recording artist Record Label ist, Background
gets paid from Musicians and/
sales as negoti- or Vocalists
ated through
label
IV. THE STORY OF PEGGY THE PODCASTER
Peggy owns a chain of fashion boutiques for women, called
Peggy's Threads, and she is an expert on emerging trends in teenage
78. GLOSSARY OF TERMS FOR TABLES
PP: Public Performance
PRO: Performing Rights Organization, i.e., ASCAP, BMI, SESAC
and their international affiliates
NML: Negotiated Mechanical License
CML: Compulsory Mechanical License
MRO: Music Rights Organization
MRL: Music Rights License
Mashups: Digital re-mixes of the fixed musical digitized sounds of a
recorded song, possibly in connection with other, different
fixed musical digitized sounds, to create a new,
transformative song that may or may not resemble the
original fixed musical sounds. See supra note 60 for a
further discussion of mashups.
79. See HFA: Ringtones, http://www.harryfox.com/public/infoFAQRing
tones.jsp (last visited Mar. 2, 2006) (discussing licenses of Ringtones).
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fashion. She also owns and maintains a popular interactive website
at www.peggysthreads.com.
While in high school, Peggy recalled learning that the United
States Constitution embodies, in Article I, § 8, Clause 8, the impe-
tus for the institution of the United States Copyright Act. She also
learned that the primary purpose of the United States copyright
laws are to maximize the public availability of creative works in or-
der to facilitate the creation of more original works. Essentially, the
copyright law is in existence for the public welfare.
Therefore, Peggy decided to take advantage of exciting new
technology and create a podcast. She discovered that a podcast is
an Internet-based radio program which sits on a "server"80 and is
offered on a website for consumers to download onto their portable
digital device, such as an MP3 player or an iPod®. Each podcast is
archived on its website. Moreover, podcasts generally offer free
subscriptions. Each radio program created will appear on the con-
sumer's computer on a designated website, such as iTunes®, or the
podcaster's own website, i.e., www.peggysthreads.com, ready for the
consumer to download and enjoy.
Peggy thought it would be a wonderful idea to create a weekly
podcast featuring interviews with fashion industry professionals.
She used some pre-existing sound recordings by artists like Britney
Spears, Madonna, and Alicia Keyes as introductions to her inter-
views and as underscores for some of her opinion pieces. Also, she
featured some underground, trendy artists' songs as representative
of the fashion counter-culture. Peggy thought the podcast was a
terrific way to publicize and promote Peggy's Threads. Indeed, the
traffic to her online store increased dramatically after only a few
weeks of podcasting. Moreover, Peggy received numerous emails
praising her for bringing such insight into the world of fashion, as
well as positive feedback on the musical interludes and background
scores.
One afternoon, Peggy was having lunch with her attorney, who
informed her that she needed permission from the owners of the
recordings she used in her podcasts. Peggy asked her attorney what
she needed to do in order to receive such permission. The attorney
80. See Wikipedia: Server (Computing), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server
_%28computing%29#Server-applications (last visited Mar. 2, 2006) (defining
"server" as "a computer system that provides services to other computing systems -
called clients - over a network").
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enumerated the licenses Peggy would need to obtain in order to
comply with the United States Copyright Act.
81
First, Peggy was reproducing and distributing recordings,
which embody two copyrightable elements: the composition 82 and
the sound recording.83 Accordingly, Peggy would need to obtain
certain licenses for each of those elements. For the compositions
embodied in the sound recordings, Peggy would need to obtain
mechanical licenses, either negotiated or compulsory, from the
publisher(s) for each and every song. In order to do so, Peggy must
contact the Harry Fox Agency ("HFA"). This agency issues mechan-
ical licenses on behalf of music owners (publishers) to music
users.84 HFA can tell Peggy if the publisher(s) of the compositions
she has used registered the particular compositions. If she chose to
utilize the Act's procedures for obtaining compulsory mechanical
licenses, she may do so, but these procedures are cumbersome.
85
For example, in the event the compositions were indeed regis-
tered with HFA, Peggy would need to obtain the official HFA
mechanical license forms86 and fill them out. After that, she would
need to pay HFA, who would then disseminate the revenue to the
rightful publisher(s). 87 Further, in the event the publisher(s) had
NOT registered the compositions with HFA, Peggy would be re-
quired to locate each publisher of each composition and obtain
their signatures on a mechanical license,88 giving her the rights to
reproduce and distribute the compositions in the podcast. Moreo-
ver, if the compositions Peggy would like to use in her podcasts
have not been previously distributed, Peggy must obtain a First Use
81. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2005) (setting forth current U.S. copyright law).
82. For a discussion of the term "composition," see supra note 57 and accom-
panying text.
83. For a discussion of the term "sound recording," see supra note 58 and
accompanying text.
84. See HFA, supra note 52 (follow "Licensee information" hyperlink) (noting
that "the Harry Fox Agency, Inc. offers publishers and licensees a single source for
licensing and for the collection and distribution of royalties").
85. See 17 U.S.C. § 115(b) - (c) (2005) (pending legislation H.R. 1036, 109th
Cong. (1st Sess. 2005)) (explaining legislative requisite for compulsory mechanical
license).
86. See, e.g., HFA Mechanical License Request, http://www.harryfox.com/
docs/m-license laccountapp.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2006) (providing HFA
Mechanical License Request form that first-time licensees need to complete).
87. See HFA: What Does HFA do exactly?, http://www.harryfox.com/public/
FAQ.jsp#2 (last visited Mar. 2, 2006) (detailing HFA's dissemination of revenue to
appropriate publishers).
88. See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2004) (setting forth parameters under which party
may negotiate mechanical license). A mechanical license derives its name from
the act of "mechanically" reproducing a phonorecord onto a fixed medium. See id.
25
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Mechanical License for each undistributed composition.89 These
licenses must be negotiated with the composition's publisher(s).
This will cost Peggy approximately 9.1 cents per composition per
podcast downloaded. 90
Even if Peggy managed to perfectly comply with the Act and
obtain all the requisite licenses for use of the compositions, Peggy
must then maintain comprehensive records of how many podcast
subscribers she has in order to keep track of the number of times
the compositions are downloaded from her podcast. Then, Peggy
would pay the publisher(s) accordingly. Peggy, however, questions
the feasibility of knowing how many people are actually download-
ing her podcast at any given point in time.
Furthermore, Peggy would like to use a large number of com-
positions, some in their entirety, and only portions of others. It is
extremely burdensome for her to obtain individual mechanical li-
censes for each composition. Finally, because Peggy is only using a
portion of some compositions, she will also need to obtain permis-
sion to create a derivative work91 for each composition she excerpts
because the rights-holder(s) may argue she is altering the funda-
mental nature of the work.
This mechanical license scheme and payment structure is cost-
prohibitive for Peggy. It also creates an administrative stranglehold
and a creative conundrum. This results in an intolerable limitation
on Peggy's ability to create and offer her work (the podcast) to the
public.
89. See id. (providing that no compulsory mechanical license is available for
musical work if that work has not yet been distributed). The "first use" of the work
is reserved to the work's copyright owner, and as such, the owner may or may not
decide to grant another person or entity the right to mechanically reproduce and
distribute the musical work onto a phonorecord. See id.
90. See Copyright Royalty Rates Section 115, the Mechanical License, http://
www.copyright.gov/carp/m200a.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2006) (explaining Mech-
anical License Royalty Rates).
91. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (nothing that "the owner of copyright ... has the
exclusive rights to authorize . .. [the creation] of derivative works based on the
copyrighted work"); see also id. § 101 (describing derivative work). The statute
reads:
A "derivative work" is a work based upon one or more preexisting
works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fiction-
alization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction,
abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be
recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions,
annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, re-
present an original work of authorship, is a "derivative work."
Id. § 101.
[Vol. 13: p. 271
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Unfortunately, Peggy's legal morass is far from over. Peggy has
discovered that she must pay additional public performance royal-
ties to the compositions' copyright-holders via the established per-
forming rights organizations ("PROs"), which are ASCAP, BMI, and
SESAC.92 Generally, when any type of broadcast entity wishes to
legally and publicly perform another's song, whether over the air-
waves or Internet, that entity must obtain a license from the afore-
mentioned PROs.93
In Peggy's case, because her podcast is an Internet site, her
public performance royalty cost may be alleviated to some degree.
She is entitled to obtain an Experimental Internet Site License
from ASCAP, 94 a Web Site Music Performance Agreement from
BMI,9 5 and SESAC's Internet License. 96 The licensing fees set forth
in these agreements are "sliding scale" style fees, based on gross
revenues or music revenues. Although Peggy is receiving a finan-
cial benefit because of the increased traffic on her website, which
results in sales, she is not generating much direct revenue. There-
fore, it is arguable whether such income should be included when
calculating the "sliding scale" fee.
Even though Peggy can realistically assess and therefore pre-
dict her yearly public performance licensing fees under these fee
plans, for a small podcaster like Peggy, this cost is a significant fac-
tor to weigh as Peggy contemplates her podcast's continued exis-
tence. Moreover, Peggy feels that she is already paying publishers
for the use of the songs via mechanical licenses, and suspects that
92. See ASCAP, http://www.ascap.com/about/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2006) (de-
scribing ASCAP as American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers); BMI,
http://www.bmi.com/about/backgrounder.asp (last visited Mar. 2, 2006)
(describing BMI as Broadcast Music Incorporated); SESAC, http://www.sesac.
com/about.aspx (last visited Mar. 2, 2006) (describing SESAC as Society of Euro-
pean Stage Authors and Composers). These three performing rights organizations
represent the interests of copyright owners of compositions, i.e., publishers, by
issuing public performance licenses to, and collecting public performance royal-
ties from, entities that engage in public performances of copyrighted composi-
tions, e.g., television, radio, live performance venues. See, e.g., SESAC: Why do I
need a license for my website?, http://www.sesac.com/licensing/internetlicens-
ing-faq.aspx#sesacA (explaining need for license due to U.S. copyright law).
93. For an explanation of the aformentioned PROs, see supra note 92.
94. See, e.g., ASCAP Experimental License Agreement for Internet Sites & Ser-
vices - 5.0, http://www.ascap.com/weblicense/ascap.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2006)
(displaying ASCAP Experimental License Agreement for Internet Sites & Services
form).
95. See, e.g., BMI Licensing, Web Site Music Performance Agreement, http://
www.bmi.com/licensing/forms/Internet005A.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2006) (dis-
playing BMI Web Site Music Performance Agreement form).
96. See SESAC Internet License, http://www.sesac.com/pdf/internet_2006.
pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2006) (displaying SESAC Internet License form).
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this cost constitutes "double-dipping." She argues she is not really
broadcasting the compositions used in her podcast, but rather, her
podcasts are being downloaded directly to individuals in the privacy
of their homes or offices. Therefore, Peggy's podcast pursuit is sub-
ject to yet another administrative layer and cost.
Finally, with respect to Peggy's use of the compositions, she
must gain permission to allow her son, an audio engineer and "disc
jockey," to create transformative "mashups" of some select record-
ings, resulting in derivative works. These "mashups" are new, origi-
nal creations, and Peggy's audience responds favorably to them.
Arguably, the transformative nature of the derivative work may miti-
gate in favor of such use as a fair use.9 7 No legal bright line, how-
ever, exists with respect to what does or what does not constitute
fair use.98
97. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2005) (pending legislation H.R. 4536, 109th Cong.
(1st Sess. 2005)) (allowing certain uses of copyrighted works without permission of
copyright owners under certain circumstances). Under the Fair Use Doctrine, the
most important factor the courts consider is whether the use infringes on the copy-
right owner's market for the original work, i.e., whether the copyright owner en-
gages in distributing her work in this market. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576 (1994) (discussing fair use provision of Copyright Act).
The Court concluded with respect to the provision of the Copyright Act of
1976 (17 U.S.C. § 107) that fair use of a copyrighted work does not constitute
infringement. See id. at 579-85. The main purpose of investigating the purpose
and character of a use under 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) is to determine whether a new
work (1) "merely supersedes the objects of the original creation," or (2) instead is
transformative, that is, "adds something new, with a further purpose or different
character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message; . . .
[a]lthough such transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair
use"-the straight reproduction of multiple copies for classroom distribution be-
ing an exception to such necessity-"the more transformative the new work, the
less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh
against a finding of fair use." Id. at 579.
98. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (describing what constitutes fair use).
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use
of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for pur-
poses such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a
work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall
include -
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of
fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above
factors.
[Vol. 13: p. 271
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A further complication for Peggy could arise if any of the com-
positions she uses in her podcast have not been previously distrib-
uted, making Peggy the "first user" of the composition. In that
case, the composition is not subject to a compulsory mechanical
license. Instead, Peggy must negotiate a license with the composi-
tion's individual rights-holder(s). 9 There is no guarantee that
Peggy will be successful in such a negotiation. The rights-holder
has the ability to restrict her from reproducing and distributing the
relevant composition. The licenses and permissions outlined above
only apply to the composition. To legally use the sound recordings
for her podcasts, Peggy must also obtain concomitant licenses for
the sound recordings.100
First, because no compulsory mechanical licenses are available
for sound recordings under the Act,10 ' she must negotiate each li-
cense for each sound recording's reproduction and distribution.
Second, she must register each sound recording used with
SoundExchange,10 2 the organization that collects and disseminates
public performance royalties for digital public performances of
sound recordings. 10 3 If Peggy is eligible as a non-interactive broad-
caster, and she complies with the matrix of rules, including the
"sound recording performance complement"'0 4 set forth in the
Act, she may be able to apply for a digital public performance statu-
Id.
99. See id. § 115 (detailing "First Use Rule").
100. See id. § 114 (describing subject matter and scope of copyrights).
101. See id. §§ 114, 115 (describing copyright scope of non-dramatic musical
works).
102. See SoundExchange, http://www.soundexchange.com/about/about.
html (last visited Mar. 2, 2006) (describing SoundExchange®, Inc.).
[It] is a dynamic, 501(c) (6) nonprofit performance rights organiza-
tion embodying hundreds of recording companies and thousands of art-
ists united in receiving fair compensation for the licensing of their music
in the new and ever-expanding digital world. Modern technology makes
all of our lives a little bit simpler and SoundExchange takes full advantage
of its accuracy and efficiency to license, collect and distribute public per-
formance revenues for sound recording copyright owners (SRCOs) and
artists for noninteractive digital transmissions on cable, satellite and web-
cast services.
Id.
103. See Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L.
No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995) (amending Copyright Act to add exclusive right in
copyright to Section 106: public performance right for digital performances in
sound recordings); see also Lionel S. Sobel, A New Music Law for the Age of Digital
Technology, 17 EN. L. REP. 3, 3 (Nov. 1995) (stating that President Clinton signed
Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995 into law on November
1, 1995).
104. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat.
2860, 2891 (1998) (detailing "sound recording performance complement").
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tory license. 10 5 Therefore, Peggy will pay the statutory rate set forth
in the Act. This is less expensive and more predictable than engag-
ing in individual, negotiated licenses for public performance of the
sound recordings. Nevertheless, this remains a huge administrative
burden for Peggy to bear. Finally, she must negotiate derivative
work10 6 licenses for each and every sound recording her son uses
for his creative "mashups."
With respect to the sound recordings, however, Peggy may
have a problem because sound recordings are subject to negotia-
tion, not compulsory or mandatory licenses. There is no guarantee
that Peggy will be able to obtain them from the copyright owners,
let alone afford the proffered licensing fees. Because sound record-
ings are not subject to compulsory mechanical licenses, the sound
recording owners (record labels and/or recording artists) may re-
fuse to license them to Peggy for her use, despite the fact that they
may have been previously distributed. Moreover, in addition to the
above-stated payments, Peggy must make royalty payments, in ac-
105. See id.; see also SoundExchange: What digital music services are covered
by a statutory license?, http://www.soundexchange.com/licensingl01.html#a2
(last visited Mar. 2, 2006) (describing basics of copyright licensing).
The section 114 statutory license covers public performances by four
classes of digital music services: eligible nonsubscription services (i.e.,
noninteractive webcasters and simulcasters that charge no fees), preexist-
ing subscription services (i.e., residential subscription services providing
music over digital cable or satellite television), new subscription services
(i.e., noninteractive webcasters and simulcasters that charge a fee), and
preexisting satellite digital audio radio services (i.e., XM and SIRIUS sat-
ellite radio services). The section 112 statutory license covers ephemeral
reproductions (i.e., temporary server copies) made by all digital music
services covered by the section 114 license as well as certain background
music services that are exempt from paying public performance royalties
under section 114.
To obtain a statutory license, you must first notify sound recording copy-
right owners by filing a "Notice of Use" with the Copyright Office. All
services must file a Notice of Use prior to making the first ephemeral
copy or first digital transmission of a sound recording to avoid being sub-
ject to liability for copyright infringement. In addition, all services that
were in operation prior to April 12, 2004 and intend to remain in opera-
tion after July 1, 2004 must file a Notice Of Use with the Copyright Office
not later than July 1, 2004, even if such service previously filed a Notice of
Intent with the Office. In the future, services may be required to update
their Notices of Use at regular intervals. The Copyright Office expects to
announce any such requirements when it issues final Notice and Record-
keeping regulations sometime in the future.
SoundExchange: What digital music services are covered by a statutory license?,
supra.
106. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2005) (stating that copyright owner has exclusive
rights to authorize creation of derivative works that are based on copyrighted
work).
[Vol. 13: p. 271
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cordance with the Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, once
her podcast generates a certain level of revenue. 10 7
Peggy was understandably concerned and upset about the time
and money spent on this uncertain licensing nightmare, and had
some legitimate policy questions: (1) Isn't it double or quadruple-
dipping for rights-holders to demand mechanical royalties and pub-
lic performance royalties, both for the sound recording and the
song?; (2) Why should she be forced to spend inordinate amounts
of time and effort obtaining individual mechanical licenses for each
song and sound recording, or alternatively, have to follow the in-
comprehensible procedures for securing compulsory mechanical li-
censes for each composition set forth in the Act?; (3) Does her use
of music "clips" constitute derivative works,108 even though she feels
she isn't changing the song or the sound recording's fundamental
nature?; (4) Isn't her use of the music considered "fair use"?; 10 9 and
(5) Aren't her son's "mashups" transformative enough to constitute
"fair use"110?
As a result of all of these convoluted machinations, Peggy re-
luctantly decided to discontinue her podcasts. Consequently, the
current licensing hoops impeded Peggy's ability to interact with the
public, and detracted from the fundamental premise of copyright
law and the United States Constitution. Table III, listed below,
demonstrates the licenses and rights implicated by current copy-
right law.
107. See Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-321, 116
Stat. 2780, 2780-85 (2002) (amending Section 112 and Section 114 statutory li-
censes in Copyright Act as they relate to small webcasters and noncommercial web-
casters). Among other things, the Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002 allows
SoundExchange, the Receiving Agent designated by the Librarian of Congress in
his June 20, 2002 order, to collect royalty payments made by eligible nonsubscrip-
tion transmission services under Sections 112 and 114 statutory licenses, to enter
into agreements on behalf of all copyright owners and performers, and to set rates,
terms, and conditions for small commercial webcasters operating under the sec-
tion 112 and section 114 statutory licenses. See Determination of Reasonable Rates
and Terms for the Digital Performance of Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Re-
cordings, 67 Fed. Reg. 45239, 45239-45276 (July 8, 2002) (to be codified at 37 CFR
pt. 261).
108. See U.S. Copyright Office - Fair Use, http://www.copyright.gov/fls/fl
102.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2006) (discussing derivative works).
109. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992) (providing fair use doctrine).
110. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 572 (1994) (decid-
ing that "commercial character of song parody" should be evaluated in fair use
inquiry).
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TABLE III. PROPOSED RIGHTS AND LICENSES - THE COMPULSORY
MRL* UNDER THE NEW MRO**
DIGITAL
PUBLIC DERIVATIVE PUBLIC
REPRODUCTION DISTRIBUTION PERFORMANCE WORK PERFORMANCE
Included in Included in Compulsory Included in IN SOUND
Types of Rights NML*** NML under MRO NML RECORDING
License Needed First Use Period: First Use Peri- MRO for digital First Use N/A (digital PP
for Composi- NML for nine od: NML for and analog: Period: rights for Com-
tion (including month period of nine month Compulsory Negotiated positions licen-
synch usage) use period Blanket or Per Derivative sed via MRO)
After First Use After First Use Song License Work Licen-
Period: Period: under new MRO se for nine
Compulsory MRL Compulsory from first date month period
under MRO M]RL under of public per- After First




License Needed First Use Period: First Use Create new First Use MRO License
for Sound NML for nine Period: NML right: Period:
recording month period of for nine month Analog PP in SR: Negotiated
(including use period of use MRO for ana- Derivative
synch usage) After First Use After First Use log: Compulsory Work Licen-
Period: Period: Blanket or Per se for nine
Compulsory MRL Compulsory Song License month
under MRO MRL under under new MRO period
MRO from first date After First




Who gets paid Publisher, i.e., Publisher, i.e., Publisher Publisher Publisher
for the Compo- Copyright Owner Copyright
sition Owner
Who gets paid Copyright Owner, Copyright Both digital and Record Record label
for the Sound i.e., generally, Owner, i.e., analog SR per- Label and Recording
Recording Record Label generally, formance, Artist
Record Label record label and
recording artist
* Music Rights License
** Music Rights Organization
** Negotiated Mechanical License
In today's digital world, nearly every public performance of a
composition and digitized sound recording results in either an ac-
tual reproduction and distribution of that composition, or the po-
tential for there to be one. Moreover, the ability to define what
constitutes an ephemeral recording is blurry at best. 1 It is nearly
inipossible, at this point in time, for copyright-holders who zeal-
ously maintain almost absolute control of their original works to
continue to do so. There has always been an inherent tension be-
111. See 17 U.S.C. § 112 (2004) (attempting to clarify definition). Digital mu-
sic subscription services offer recordings for download, which can be listened to on
their specific digital music devices, but the recordings are never actually owned. If
a subscriber stops the service, the recording disappears - at least in theory. New
devices, in all probability, will alter that. Currently, however, if one never owns a
recording, and it can disappear at any time, is that recording considered ephem-
eral or fixed? This question has not been adequately addressed or answered.
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tween the rights-holders of original works and the consumers of
those works. The new technologies available today have amplified
that historic tension to the breaking point.
V. PROPOSAL FOR RADICAL CHANGE
When the United States joined The Berne Convention11 2 in
1989, it agreed to align its copyright policies with the other treaty
members by increasing the term of copyright to life of the last living
author plus an additional fifty years. At that time, no one could
have anticipated the impact of the Internet on the music industry.
Giving a considerably longer "monopoly" period of control to au-
thors and creators seemed reasonable and warranted. In 1998,
Congress passed the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act1 13
increasing the "limited monopoly" copyright term seventy years af-
ter author's death.
It is not suggested the United States reassess its compliance
with the Berne Convention. The "limited monopoly" must stand,
even though it is arguable that this length of time actually imposes
more than a "limited" monopoly. In fact, this argument was for-
warded and rejected by the Supreme Court in the recent case of
Eldred v. Ashcroft.' 1 4
Instead, the proposed changes will radically alter the Act. The
primary reasons for the following proposals are to: (1) impose rea-
112. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works
(Paris Text 1971): Article 7, http://www.law.cornell.edu/treaties/berne/7.html
(last visited Mar. 2, 2006) ("The term of protection granted by this Convention
shall be life of the author and fifty years after his death."). The Berne Convention
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, of 1886 (completed at Paris in
1896, revised at Berlin in 1908, completed at Berne in 1914, revised at Rome in
1928, at Brussels in 1948, at Stockholm in 1967, and at Paris in 1971, and amended
in 1979) aimed to assist nationals of its member countries in obtaining interna-
tional protection of their right to control, and receive payment for, the use of their
creative works. See Wikipedia: Berne Convention for the Protection of the Literary
and Artistic Works, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BerneConvention_for_the_
Protection-of Literaryand_- Artistic-Works (last visited Mar. 3, 2006).
113. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1998)
(pending legislation H.R. 2408, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005)) (increasing dura-
tion of copyright protection of original works to life of author plus seventy years).
114. 537 U.S. 186 (2003). Petitioners in the Eldred case made two main argu-
ments. The first was that retroactive extension of the Sonny Bono Term Extension
Act (17 U.S.C. § 302) (the "Bono Act") surpassed Congressional authority under
the "limited time" language of Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States
Constitution. See id. at 193-94. The second argument was that the Bono Act vio-
lated the First Amendment by keeping works out of the public domain. See id. The
Supreme Court rejected both arguments. See id. at 194. This arguably caused over
375,000 works, slated to enter the public domain had the Court struck down the
Bono Act, to remain in private hands.
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sonable charges on those who financially benefit from digital distri-
bution; (2) reward those who create content for such digital
distribution; (3) allow content to flow freely from creator to con-
sumer; and (4) de-criminalize the downloading and sharing of mu-
sic by otherwise law-abiding American citizens. All parties, except
the consumer, financially benefit from the use of intellectual prop-
erty, especially musical works. Therefore, all parties must pay ac-
cording to the specific type of use and the scale of financial benefit
gained.
Many additional revisions should be explored beyond the
scope of this article; however, the following proposed revisions re-
present salient and timely ones. First, eliminate the need for, or
revise, Sections 108 through 122115 of the Act, with the exception of
Section 109.116 Section 109 encompasses the limitations, excep-
tions, and definitions of the scope of the misnamed "exclusive"
rights granted under Section 106117 and Section 114.118 The rights
granted under the aforesaid sections purport to offer copyright
holders an exclusivity for their rights, but at the same time take it
away. The constraints and restrictions attached to the purportedly
exclusive rights not only unnecessarily complicate the exercise of
these rights, they effectively erode them.
Second, revise the Audio Home Recording Act' 19 to raise the
royalty surcharge to two-and-one-half percent (2.5%), and broaden
the definition of "digital audio recording devices"' 20 to include
computers and all digital devices that contain hard drives. Third,
115. See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 108-122 (2005) (describing limitations and
scope of copyright law).
116. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1997) (pending legislation H.R. 4536, 109th Cong. (1st
Sess. 2005)) (detailing Limitations on exclusive rights: Effect of transfer of particu-
lar copy or phonorecord).
117. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002) (setting forth authors' exclusive rights in original
works).
118. 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2004) (pending legislation H.R. 1036, 109th Cong.
(1st Sess. 2005)) (setting forth exclusive rights of copyright owners of sound
recordings).
119. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-10 (2005) (providing text of Audio Home Recording
Act).
120. See 17 U.S.C. § 1001(3) (1992). Under the Audio Home Recording Act
of 1992, a "digital audio recording device" is currently defined as:
[A]ny machine or device of a type commonly distributed to individuals
for use by individuals, whether or not included with or as part of some
other machine or device, the digital recording function of which is de-
signed or marketed for the primary purpose of, and that is capable of,
making a digital audio copied recording for private use, except for -
(A) professional model products, and
(B) dictation machines, answering machines, and other audio re-
cording equipment that is designed and marketed primarily for the crea-
[Vol. 13: p. 271
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revise Section 107, the "Fair Use Doctrine,"121 to impose a "fair
use" royalty on "fair user" entities or persons. Fourth, revise the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 ("DMCA"),122 to comport
with the United States Constitution. The DMCA must also be re-
vised with respect to the "sound recording complement."1 23 Fi-
nally, create and implement a surcharge on Internet Service
Providers ("ISPs").
VI. EXPLANATIONS OF PROPOSED REVISIONS
A. Eliminating the need for, or revising The Copyright Act's
Sections 108 Through 122 Except Section 109
The Act must eliminate the need for, or revise the extensive
exceptions and limitations to the copyright owners' exclusive rights
as set forth in Section 106 of the Act and replace Sections 108-22
with a nine-month "Author's Reserved Rights Complement"
("ARRC").124 The ARRC would be a monopoly with no exceptions
or limitations, commencing on the date of first publication as set
forth in the copyright owner's registration application. This nine-
month ARRC would allow and encourage the copyright owner to
maximize her market for her copyrighted work, without any addi-
tional administrative or legislative burdens, limitations, or excep-
tions. 125 Furthermore, and in furtherance of the public welfare,
this provision encourages creators, authors, and originators to pub-
tion of sound recordings resulting from the fixation of nonmusical
sounds.
Id.
121. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992) (pending legislation H.R. 4536, 109th Cong. (1st
Sess. 2005)) (describing subject matter and scope of fair use).
122. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (legislating Congressional re-
sponse to advent of internet enabling individuals to easily download movies, music,
and software for free, while companies spent money to develop antipiracy technol-
ogies); see also Brandon K. Lemley, Fighting Piracy in the Digital Age: The Digital Mil-
lennium Copyright Act, 10 THE YOUNG LAw. 1 (Nov. 2005) (describing DMCA which
"makes it unlawful [for end-users (i.e. everyday consumers)] to circumvent an-
tipiracy technologies" at risk of being subjected to lawsuit).
123. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat.
2860, 2891 (1998) (codified as amended in 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2005)) (describing
Congressional response to digital downloading and copyright piracy on internet).
124. The nine-month length of the ARRC was set in order to coincide with
the average radio service and marketing life for three singles (songs). Generally, a
record is shipped to radio programmers one month prior to its street-date (the
date of release to consumers through retail). Subsequently, independent promot-
ers and the artist's record label continue to solicit airtime from radio stations for
approximately eight weeks. A successful single at pop radio could maintain a
twelve-month shelf-life.
125. This proposal's authors remain amenable to a proposed lesser time pe-
riod for the ARRC, but insist that this complement is nonetheless integral in the
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lish their creative works and disseminate them to a wider
population. 126
After the ARRC time period, the copyrighted work automati-
cally becomes subject to a compulsory statutory "music rights li-
cense" ("MRL"), encompassing the bundle of exclusive rights.
Nevertheless, the rights-holder continues to own the right of public
performance. 12 7 This would be accompanied by a fixed schedule of
fees. The amount of such fees depends on certain factors, includ-
ing: (1) the rights of third parties using the copyrighted work; (2)
the capacity of use; and (3) the period of time they desire its use.
The post-nine-month period MRL encompasses the rights of
reproduction, distribution, and derivative work for the composi-
tion, and the rights of reproduction, distribution, and derivative
work for the sound recording. The one exception to this scheme
resides in the right of public performance. All works are immedi-
ately subject to a compulsory MRL, commencing on the date of the
composition's and sound recording's first public performance.
128
The Act shall establish a single organization, referred to as a
Music Rights Organization ("MRO"). The MRO should administer
all royalty payments from all sources to the copyright owners of mu-
sical works. The MRO will be an independent, non-profit organiza-
balance of copyright protection afforded in today's technologically advanced
world.
126. One may argue that consumers will simply wait until the work is offered
for free, or at a lesser price to obtain it. That may be so, but it is consistently shown
that consumers have a desire to be "the first on their block" to acquire (or hear or
see) a new work as soon as or before, it hits the market. This is evidenced time and
time again, when people line up in the early morning hours to see the new "Star
Wars" movie. People also eagerly go to the record stores on the release date to
purchase, for example, the new Kelly Clarkson CD at its top-line price. The top-
line price is the price at which major retailers, such as Sam Goody, Coconuts, or
Tower sell the record. Moreover, there is at least informal and anecdotal evidence
that it is considered "cool" to be the discoverer of a new, underground, and inde-
pendent recording artist. Bloggers, podcasters, and the general population thrive
on the excitement of telling their compatriots, readers, and listeners about new
music and recording artists. One may somewhat analogize the model to the film
industry, as films are shown exclusively in theaters for a fixed period of time before
they are available on a DVD for rental.
127. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 106A (2006) (delineating exclusive rights of crea-
tor/author).
128. This allows the Music Rights Organization ("MRO") to begin tracking
airplay and other types of public performance as soon as the work is being publicly
performed. Currently, it is not administratively feasible for the work's owner, dur-
ing the market-maximizing nine-month ARRC time period, to track airplay on the
thousands of terrestrial, satellite, and Internet and HD (i.e., high definition digital
band) radio stations. Therefore, the format for collecting royalties for public per-
formances would essentially remain intact, but under one umbrella organization:
the MRO.
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tion. Logistically, the Copyright Office and the MRO must remain
in constant digital communication. To illustrate, the Copyright Of-
fice instantly sends all registration data on each application it re-
ceives directly into the MRO's database. Such registration data
includes new registration applications, as well as all received trans-
fers, assigns, addenda, revisions, and any other documents that will
affect the copyright owners' and music users' payments. The MRO
maintains this database with daily updates available to music users
by sustaining a 24-hour turnaround on copyright information. The
revised statute shall provide that all MRO databases are copied and
maintained in the Copyright Office's servers for cross-referencing
and archiving purposes.
The MRO would issue either "blanket" licenses 129 or "per
work" licenses. 130 This new scheme amends Section 106131 and the
Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995.132 It
does so by extending the public performance right, both digital
and analog,133 currently enjoyed by copyright owners of composi-
tions to the copyright owners of sound recordings.
Sound recording copyright owners would then receive public
performance royalties for terrestrial, live venue, or analog broad-
cast public performances, as well as digital public performances.
Record labels and recording artists are the benefactors of the addi-
tional royalty payments, in accordance with the current royalty pay-
129. A blanket license encompasses the entire catalogue registered with the
MRO and commands a higher monthly fee.
130. A per work license is for those entities for whom reproducing, distribut-
ing, publicly performing, and/or creating derivative works are incidental.
131. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (setting forth exclusive rights granted to au-
thors in original works of authorship under Copyright Act of 1976 as amended).
132. See Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L.
No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995) ("DPRA") (amending 17 U.S.C. § 106 to include
right of digital public performance to copyright owners of sound recordings); see
also RLAA, Glossary of Terms, http://www.riaa.com/issues/glossary/default.asp
(follow "D-F" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 2, 2006) (noting that prior to DRPA,
sound recordings were "only U.S. copyrighted work denied the right of public per-
formance"). The DPRA, however, placed a limit on this performance right by
creating a new statutory license that allows nonexempt, non-interactive subscrip-
tion digital audio transmission services to publicly perform those recordings
through digital audio transmission. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(d) (2) (2006). In order to
operate under the license, however, eligible digital audio services must comply
with certain conditions such as providing payment for the use of the license and
adherence to notice and record keeping requirements. See 17 U.S.C. § 114
(f)(4) (1) (A)-(C) (2006) (pending legislation H.R. 1036, 109th Cong. (lst Sess.
2005).
133. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (6) (2006) (providing for right to perform sound
recordings publicly by digital audio transmission).
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ment allocations as set forth in the SoundExchange13 4 format. This
scheme also envisions the inclusion of all synchronization rights. 135
Finally, failure to register one's copyrighted work results in au-
tomatic waiver of the nine-month ARRC period. On the date of its
first publication, an unregistered work shall automatically fall
under the MRO licensing rules. If the copyright of a published
work is infringed upon, and such work is unregistered on the date
of infringement, the copyright owner shall lose the right to sue for
such infringement under the Act. The right to sue for copyright
infringement shall remain intact for all unpublished, registered
works. 136 Importantly, this provision further encourages copyright
owners to exercise their rights granted under the Act.
B. Revising the Audio Home Recording Act of
1992 ("AHRA")13 7
Currently, under the AHRA, all those who import and dis-
tribute or manufacture and distribute digital audio recording de-
vices or digital audio recording media, 13 8 must pay a royalty. The
royalty is a surcharge of two percent (2%) of the transfer price of
such devices or media. 139 The AHRA outlines a variety of configu-
rations or types of digital audio recording devices. It distinguishes
between digital audio recording devices that are self-contained and
134. See SoundExchange Background, 2003, http://www.soundexchange.
com/about/about.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2006) (discussing SoundExchange's
collection of digital public performance royalties for sound recordings and its dis-
tribution of such royalties to record labels, recording artists, background musi-
cians, and vocalists).
135. See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006) (pending legislation H.R. 1036, 109th Cong.
(1st Sess. 2005)) (failing to subject synchronization rights for compositions to
third parties by copyright owners of compositions to current compulsory mechani-
cal license). Synchronization rights entail copyright owners of both or either
songs and/or sound recordings granting a synchronization license to filmmakers
to use their copyrighted works in timed-relation with the subject audiovisual, i.e.,
the film or the TV show. "Synch licenses," as they are called, must be individually
negotiated. The PROs collect revenue from television public performances of
compositions synchronized with TV shows on major networks (ABC, CBS, NBC,
and FOX) and cable television networks. Currently, synchronization licensing fees
and other fees for sound recordings must be individually negotiated between the
film producers and the sound recording owners, as well.
136. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 501-13 (2006) (providing law governing copyright
infringement).
137. See id. §§ 1001-10 (outlining provisions of Audio Home Recording Act of
1992).
138. See id. § 1001 (3) - (4) (A) (defining terms "digital audio recording de-
vice" and "digital audio recording medium").
139. See id. § 1004 (a) (1) (requiring only "first person to manufacture and
distribute, or import and distribute" device to pay royalties for it).
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those that are merely parts of a larger or different device, thus pro-
rating the royalty surcharge accordingly.' 40
In 1999, the decision in Recording Industry Association of America
v. Diamond Multimedia System' 4' stated that "to be a digital audio
recording device, [the item] must be able to reproduce, either 'di-
rectly' or 'from a transmission,' a 'digital music recording."'1 42 The
case proclaimed that "computers (and their hard drives) are not
digital audio recording devices because their 'primary purpose' is
not to make digital audio copied recordings."143 Also, in the same
case, it was stated, "a [computer] hard drive is a material object in
which one or more programs are fixed; thus, a hard drive is ex-
cluded from the definition of digital music recordings."'144
It is an insurmountable challenge in today's digital world to
adequately discern what is or is not a computer. Certainly, a judge
would be hard-pressed to do so. One could ask, is an iPod® a com-
puter? iPods transfer information as well as contain games, contact
lists, and a calendar. iPods are also capable of receiving digital au-
dio copied recordings. Is it a "hand-held" or "pocket" PC, like HP
IPAQ®145 or a TrEo®,146 a digital audio interface device,' 47 a digi-
140. See id. § 1004(2) (establishing calculations for devices which are part of
physically integrated units or devices distributed in combination with other devices
as separate components).
141. 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999) (answering whether hand-held device ca-
pable of receiving, storing, and re-playing digital audio file stored on hard drive of
computer violated AHRA).
142. Id. at 1076.
143. Id. at 1078 (citation omitted). In fact, the Court noted, "the exclusion of
computers from the Act's scope was part of a carefully negotiated compromise
between the various industries with interests at stake, and without which, the com-
puter industry would have vigorously opposed passage of the Act." Id. at n.6. Fur-
thermore, computers are designed to be exempt from certain requirements under
the Act. See id. at 1078-79 ("because computers are not digital audio recording
devices, they are not required to comply with the SCMS requirement and thus
need not send, receive, or act upon information regarding copyright and genera-
tion status").
144. Id. at 1076 (confirming status of hard drive under AHRA).
145. See HP Handheld Devices - IPAQ & Calculators, http://welcome.hp.
com/country/us/en/prodserv/handheld.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2006) (provid-
ing brief description of IPAQ pocket PC).
146. See palmOne - Products - Trio600 Smartphone, http://www.palm.com/
us/products/smartphones/treo600/?sourcel =thetreostore&KWOPT-no-popup-
PALMONE.1.1000.client=true (last visited Mar. 2, 2006) (giving description of
Trio "smartphone").
147. See 17 U.S.C. § 1001 (2) (2006) (defining digital audio interface device as
"any machine or device that is designed specifically to communicate digital audio
information and related interface data to a digital audio recording device through
a nonprofessional interface").
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tal audio recording device,' 48 and/or a computer? Each of these
contains a hard drive.
Therefore, the question is, should these devices remain ex-
empt from the royalty surcharge imposed on "digital audio record-
ing devices" under the AHRA? One must take into account the fact
that websites and device owners share music and video content.
One must also acknowledge that people commonly do and are ex-
pected to download music and video onto these devices. Further-
more, it must be noted that people purchase these devices because
the hard drive allows them to receive and store digital audio record-
ings. In light of all these considerations, the answer must be "No."
In 2004, Congress passed the Copyright Royalty and Distribu-
tion Reform Act, 149 which established Copyright Royalty Judges.
These judges oversee royalty payments and disputes. 150 However,
language that addresses broadening the definition of "digital audio
recording devices" to include new technologies is notably absent.
Therefore, three major remedies to this issue are proposed:
(i) Broadening the definition of "digital audio record-
ing devices" to include all computer and computer-like de-
vices, including any devices which are able to receive or
record audio and devices possessing a hard drive;
(ii) Increasing the royalty payment imposed on the
importation, manufacture and distribution of such devices
to two-and-one-half percent (2.5%); and
(iii) Eliminating the distinctions between devices that
are only partly digital audio recording devices and those
which are only digital audio recording devices. (The lines
between the technological devices can no longer be mean-
ingfully articulated.)
The proposed royalty increase emanates from the reality that
an entire generation has grown up with the idea that music is, if not
free, then very inexpensive. This proposal's thrust is to impose
charges on those who directly financially benefit from receiving and
sharing digital music files. It cannot be disputed that computer
148. See id. § 1001 (3) (defining digital audio recording device as "any ma-
chine or device of a type commonly distributed to individuals ... the digital re-
cording function of which is designed or marketed for the primary purpose of, and
that is capable of, making a digital audio copied recording for private use" (excep-
tions omitted)).
149. See Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-419, 118 Stat. 2341 (2004) (codified as amended in 17 U.S.C. § 803).
150. See id. at 2341-45 (detailing functions of Copyright Royalty Judges).
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manufacturers and importers benefit greatly from the ability of
these devices to record, transmit, and receive digital music files.
C. Revise the "Fair Use Doctrine"
The Fair Use Doctrine is looked upon as the Copyright Act's
proverbial "third rail." The existence of new technologies, such as
the iPod®, has called into question the scope of both the Fair Use
Doctrine and the First Sale Doctrine, which operate concomi-
tantly.15 1 The proposed revision retains, intact, the four factors of
"fair use."152 Fair use is the only exception to the nine-month
ARRC, which allows copyright owners to exclusively and freely exer-
cise their rights to their works under the Act. The scheme envisions
this exception to entail a Compulsory Fair Use License ("CFUL"),
151. See Susan Butler, iPods Loaded with Issues, BILLBOARD, Nov. 12, 2005, at 12
(discussing scope of Fair Use and First Sale Doctrines as they relate to resale of
iPods and CD collections). The scope of the Fair Use Doctrine has most recently
come into question, for example, as consumers are using eBay to auction off iPods
and CD collections, after first copying the music into their iTunes. See id. Cur-
rently, the Fair Use Doctrine permits the copying of "music for personal (noncom-
mercial) use [to] share .. .with a select group of others." Id. According to Bill
Patry, a partner with Thelen Reid & Priest, once a CD is sold, the consumer may
still maintain a digital copy on iTunes® and on an iPod. See id. Similarly, the First
Sale Doctrine permits a consumer to purchase a digital copy from iTunes and store
it in their iTunes library. See id. However, it is much less clear, and highly improb-
able, that the Doctrine would permit a consumer to "maintain an iTunes library on
their computer, copy it over to an iPod, sell the iPod and then keep filling and
selling iPods with that computer-based song library." Id. The Fair Use and First
Sale Doctrines likely did not even envision this type of behavior that can be fre-
quently accomplished with modem technology. See id. For a further discussion of
the Fair Use Doctrine, see supra notes 97-98.
152. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1)-(4)(2006) (pending legislation H.R. 4536, 109th
Cong. (1st Sess. 2005)). The statute reads:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use
of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for pur-
poses such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a
work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall
include -
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of
fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above
factors.
41
Wagman and Kopp: The Digital Revolution Is Being Downloaded: Why and How the Copyr
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2006
312 VILLANovA SPORTS & ENT. LAw JouRNAL [Vol. 13: p. 271
which gives a "fair user" the right to exercise any or all of a copy-
right owner's enumerated exclusive rights, in and to a copyrighted
work. Without the copyright owner's permission, the "fair user"
would pay a reduced royalty rate during the copyright-holder's
nine-month ARRC period. After the ARRC period has terminated,
the "fair user" may then continue to use the work without payment
to the copyright owner. It is arguable that the payment of such a
"fair user" royalty has a chilling effect on the purpose of the Fair
Use Doctrine, i.e., freedom of speech. Nevertheless, this greatly re-
duced royalty payment is implemented to avoid uncertainty about
whether or not one is a "fair user" or a use is "fair." It will also
eliminate resultant costly litigation that ensues when an entity or
person claims that they are engaging in "fair use" by using a copy-
righted work over the copyright holder's objections. The process
outlined below would eliminate such uncertainties as to the identity
of a "fair user."
In this scenario, the four factors of "fair use" are invoked to
assess if an entity or a person is eligible for such a reduced "fair use"
royalty payment to copyright owners for the use of their works dur-
ing the nine-month ARRC period. These factors are also examined
to assess the amount of the "fair use" royalty charged to "fair users."
The MRO additionally follows case law in making its decisions re-
garding a potential "fair user's" eligibility. News organizations, edu-
cational institutions, certain authors, researchers, public
noncommercial broadcasters, and other traditional, and non-tradi-
tional "fair users" must register with and concurrently apply to the
MRO as a "fair user" of copyrighted works.
If one is deemed to be a "fair user" by the MRO, one receives a
certificate of registration which is recorded in the MRO's database.
The entity then pays an assessed "fair use" royalty surcharge, which
the MRO shall accordingly distribute to the relevant copyright own-
ers. Moreover, this certificate of registration serves as prima facie
evidence, and both actual and constructive notice to the world, that
they are "fair users" of the copyrighted material. There will be an
appeals process through the MRO and the Copyright Office if an
applicant is initially denied "fair use" status.
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D. Revise the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of
1998 ("DMCA") 1 53
There are several ways in which it is proposed that the DMCA
should be revised:
(i) Anti-Circumvention
The DMCA sets forth provisions creating both civil and crimi-
nal legal sanctions for circumventions of protective technological
measures employed by copyright owners to control access to their
works. 154 These overly-broad provisions disregard the rationale be-
hind such circumvention. In only a few narrowly-drawn and specifi-
cally prescribed circumstances would circumvention avoid violating
federal law.155 These anti-circumvention provisions interfere with
the public's access to copyrighted works, as well as access to other
possible public domain elements of certain works.
This proposal suggests that Congress narrow the anti-circum-
vention provisions of the DMCA because these provisions are
overly-broad, and they also unduly chill free speech. 156 These pro-
visions also violate the intent of Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the
U.S. Constitution and the Fair Use Doctrine. 15 7 Finally, they inter-
fere with the public's right to access the public domain. 158
Under the proposed revisions, anti-circumvention technologi-
cal measures will be mandatory for all copyrighted works within a
short period of time after their first publication. Each work will fall
into a compulsory music rights licensing scheme as outlined above
153. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112
Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in 17 U.S.C § 1201 (2006)).
154. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006) (pending legislation H.R. 4536, 109th Cong.
(1st Sess. 2005)) ("No person shall circumvent a technological measure that effec-
tively controls access to a work protected under this tile.").
155. See id. (providing narrow exceptions to application).
156. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (providing "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech .. .").
157. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (pending legislation H.R. 4536, 109th Cong.
(1st Sess. 2005)) (inferring assertion from statute's fair use limitations to exclusive
rights).
158. See Wikipedia: Public Domain, 1 1, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public
-domain (last visited Mar. 2, 2006) (describing public domain and inferring limits
on it created by copyright and patent law).
The public domain comprises the body of knowledge and innovation
(especially creative works such as writing, art, music, and inventions) in
relation to which no person or other legal entity can establish or main-
tain proprietary interests. This body of information and creativity is con-
sidered to be part of the common cultural and intellectual heritage of
humanity, which in general anyone may use or exploit.
313
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after the initial nine-month ARRC period expires. The MRO will
be liable for imprinting each song with a "tracking" mechanism,
which will notify the MRO of infringement. No mechanism is fool-
proof, and there are those who will strive to circumvent such tech-
nological protective mechanisms for illegal means. The DMCA's
overreaching, however, is not the answer as it interferes with the
core principles of the Act as stated herein. Therefore, Congress
must realize the constraints consumers endure under the DMCA's
anti-circumvention provisions as unconstitutional, illegal, and only
marginally effective.
(ii) The Sound Recording Performance Complement ("SRPC")159
The "sound recording performance complement" (the
"SRPC") is one of the DMCA's most cumbersome provisions, entail-
ing an inordinate compliance burden for webcasters, small and
large alike. 160 In order to be considered for the compulsory statu-
tory license available to eligible non-interactive DCDSs, 161 a web-
caster must comply with the SRPC on an ongoing basis, or lose its
159. See 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2006) (pending legislation H.R. 1036, 109th Cong.
(1st Sess. 2005)) (providing scope of exclusive rights in sound recordings).
160. See id. (giving guidelines for licensing of sound recordings). For addi-
tional discussion of the "sound recording performance complement," see supra
notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
161. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2) (2006) (pending legislation H.R. 1036, 109th
Cong. (1st Sess. 2005)) (discussing statutory licensing). The Digital Millennium
Copyright Act of 1998 amended 17 U.S.C. § 114 by inserting the term "preexisting
subscription services." See Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860, 2890-91 (1998).
The DMCA also expanded the statutory license in Section 114 to include new cate-
gories of digital audio services that may operate under the license. The three cate-
gories created by the DMCA are: (1) preexisting satellite digital audio radio
services, (2) new subscription services, and (3) eligible non-subscription transmis-
sion services. See id. The DMCA also amended 17 U.S.C. § 112 by adding a new
license that permits digital audio services to make ephemeral recordings of a
sound recording to facilitate the transmission permitted under Section 114. See id.
at 2899-902.
In order to qualify for the compulsory license, an Internet transmission must
fit into five criteria. See Marie D'Amico, Playing Music on the Net, NETGUIDE MAG.,
Mar. 1997, http://lawcrawler.findlaw.com/MAD/playing.htm (providing five cri-
teria for Internet transmission to qualify for compulsory license). The five criteria
are as follows:
- it is non-interactive
- it does [not] exceed the sound recording performance complement
- it does [not] publish a program schedule or specify the songs to be
transmitted
- it does [not] automatically switch from one program channel to an-
other, and
- it is accompanied by certain information, such as song title and record-
ing artist.
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right to the statutory license. 162 If a webcaster is deemed ineligible,
or at any time, fails to comply with the elaborate set of rules and
loses the right to obtain the compulsory statutory license, each
sound recording performance license must be negotiated with each
sound recording copyright owner in order for the digital broadcast
to occur. More likely than not, this would result in an administra-
tive nightmare for the webcaster. The SRPC impedes small webcas-
ters from legally entering the marketplace, and as a result, prevents
new works from reaching the public. The fact that anyone can
download, share, or download and share digital music files from
nearly all digital locations without any significant generational loss,
renders this provision utterly archaic and moot. It must be re-
pealed so the webcasting marketplace can unreservedly broadcast
new, exciting, and cutting edge music without fear of recrimination
for failure to follow the current arbitrary and capricious rules.
(iii) Revising the DMCA's Internet Service Providers ("ISPs")
Provisions163
Over the last few years, a variety of interested parties have for-
warded a proposition to add a Congress-mandated surcharge on In-
ternet Service Providers ("ISPs").164 Consumers may not notice a
162. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(f) (4) (A) (2006) (requiring compliance with notice
requirements prescribed by Copyright Royalty Judges for certain nonexempt
transmissions).
163. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006) (codified as amended by Pub. L. No. 105-304,
112 Stat. 2860 (1998)) (providing limits to liability for on-line materials).
164. See John Borland, Should ISP Providers Pay for P2P?, CNET NEWS.cOM,
Dec. 4, 2003, http://news.com.com/Should+ISP+subscribers+pay+for+P2P/2100-
1027_3-5113638.html (discussing proposals aimed at collecting money from ISPs).
The first proposal, supported by the Canadian Society of Composers, Authors, and
Music Publishers, suggested that "ISPs should pay into a nationwide pool - similar
to a tax now imposed on blank tapes and CDs - to compensate copyright holders
for widespread music downloading." Id. 2. The proposal would impose a fee on
ISPs to provide songwriters with "ISP-collected royalties as a way to ameliorate po-
tential losses from piracy." Id. 8. The idea of an ISP surcharge "has already been
partially approved by a lower Canadian court, but only for those cases in which
ISPs make temporary local copies or 'caches' of content to speed downloads." Id.
As one can imagine, telecommunications companies and ISPs strongly oppose this
type of proposal, claiming they are "conduits of information, not distributors, and
so should play no role in collecting royalties." Id. 9. They also claim "the fee
would increase Internet costs across the country." Id.
A second proposal, advanced by the Distributed Computing Industry Associa-
tion ("DCIA"), "a peer-to-peer industry trade group," would allow file-sharing net-
works to operate under a model "similar to cable television." Id. 3. This
proposal would require ISPs to "collect a fee from anybody using file-trading
software and distribute that pool of money to record labels, artists and music pub-
lishers." Id. The goal behind DCIA's proposal, according to Marty Lafferty, execu-
tive director of the DCIA, is to "get three strong proposals together and start
wrestling with them by January [2004]. We want to get a critical mass of ISPs,
315
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moderate surcharge. In exchange for this small payment embed-
ded in the ISP fee, consumers could legally and inexpensively par-
take of any and all copyrighted materials offered on the Internet.
These fees would then be distributed according to the frequency of
use of the copyrighted material. Of course, this requires extensive
and costly administration. Organizations like ASCAP, BMI, SESAC,
and HFA, however, have been employing successful methods of
such data collection for a number of years. Indeed, dramatic im-
provements in new technologies have facilitated contemporaneous
improvements in data collection and royalty payments.
This surcharge would serve to supplement the revenue for
songwriters, recording artists, record labels, and publishers. This
may compensate for the potential reduction caused by this propo-
sal's "all rights included" MRO licensing scheme. Moreover, impos-
ing such a surcharge on large and financially healthy ISPs fits the
three-pronged core mission of this proposal: (1) to charge those
who directly benefit financially from copyrighted works for the
right to use such works; (2) reward the authors of those works; and
(3) allow the public to enjoy those works, unfettered, without threat
of copyright infringement litigation.
VII. BENEFICIARIES OF THE NEW COPYRIGHT REGIME
Recording label owners and executives will benefit from the
new regime because they are granted a new statutory right under
this proposal - the right of public performance for the analog or
terrestrial performances of the sound recordings they own or will
acquire. Granting this new right will augment the possible, not
probable, loss of revenue under the MRO "all rights included," par-
adigm. Recording artists will gain by being rewarded for their con-
tribution to the sound recording under this new statutory grant of
right.
Moreover, record labels' sound recordings will gain more ex-
posure. People can enjoy freer, more liberal uses of the record la-
music companies and software companies who can say, 'Yes, let's move ahead with
one of these.'" Id. 5. The DCIA proposal would assess a $5 surcharge on file
swappers' monthly ISP bills to be ultimately distributed from a pool to copyright
holders. Id. 1 11. According to Lafferty, "[e]ven if some peer-to-peer users de-
cided to stop using the software, the plan could raise nearly $2.5 billion a year." Id.
"Under the plan, ISPs would have to install software such as that from Packeteer or
other network-management companies that can identify which applications sub-
scribers are using. Some portion of the fee would go to fund those activities." Id.
1 12. DCIA's proposal has been opposed by P2P United, another "file-swapping
trade association .... which represents companies including Lime Wire, Stream-
cast Networks, Grokster and Blubster." Id. 17.
[Vol. 13: p. 271
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bel's owned works. This would increase not only the record label's
revenue, but would also create intangible benefits, such as good
will.
The Act would reduce uncertainty regarding loss of revenue
due to rampant infringement of works owned by record labels. The
ARRC period afforded to record labels under the new Act would
also make them less reluctant to sign new and unproven artists to
their labels. This is because labels would be assured more commer-
cial outlets for such artists, at a lower administrative cost. These
factors serve to fulfill the constitutionally-mandated purpose of the
Act.
Other beneficiaries include songwriters, publishers, indepen-
dent and studio filmmakers, and creators of digital media, such as
digital video games. The proposed suggestions will create an envi-
ronment in which beneficiaries will be able to use creative musical
works to their advantage, and for the public's benefit. The aggre-
gate effect of the proposed changes would make the system easier
to navigate and reduce litigation. Publishers and record labels are
no longer combatants under this new regime. Instead, they be-
come partners in developing and exploring new ways and outlets to
offer musical works to the general population.
Consumers would also benefit by seeing reduced prices. Addi-
tionally, consumers will be less afraid of litigation. Finally, the pub-
lic will have more access to a greater array of creative works.
VIII. CONCLUSION: THE STORY OF PEGGY THE
PODCASTER (REVISITED)
It is the dawn of the Digital Rights Revolution. Congress
passed this proposal's revisions. The new MRO is in place, and its
website is online. Peggy hears about the new rules and decides to
"test drive" the new regulations to see if it would be feasible for her
to resume her podcast.
While programming the podcast's format, Peggy creates a list
of the recorded songs she would like to use on her first monthly
podcast. She visits the newly-constructed MRO website and types in
the song titles in the appropriate webpage to search for the songs'
availability. Peggy immediately discovers through the MRL's cur-
rent comprehensive database that most of the songs and sound re-
cordings she wishes to use are subject to the compulsory MRL.
Because she has typed in numerous song titles that are subject
to the MRL, the MRO webpage informs her she is entitled to elect
317
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to pay a "blanket" monthly license fee, instead of a "per song" li-
cense fee. Peggy fills out the online application for a "blanket"
MRL monthly license which provides for a monthly payment for the
rights of reproduction, distribution, public performance, and crea-
tion of derivative works (her son is still an avid "mashup" artist) for
all the songs and sound recordings that are now subject to the
MRL.
However, Peggy realizes that some of the recorded songs she
would like to use still fall under the ARRC provision. For her to use
those particular works, she must wait until the nine-month period
expires or contact the publishers to negotiate a fee for their imme-
diate use. She contacts her attorney, who successfully negotiates
digital rights podcast licenses with the songs' publishers for the
ARRC period, or some portion thereof. The attorney also obtains
negotiated digital rights podcast licenses from the sound recording
copyright owners for the same periods of time. Peggy is happy to
pay the royalties; she knows that if she wishes to continue to use
these recordings after the expiration of the ARRC period, she may
do so under her "blanket" MRL. Also, she can feel secure in the
knowledge that her podcast will not infringe on anyone's rights.
The MRO, which has an Internet Tracking Division ("ITD"), shall
track Peggy's podcasts, review them for infringement, and find that
she is in compliance with the new regulations. Peggy receives con-
firmation emails to reflect her compliance. If the MRO's ITD had a
question regarding Peggy's compliance, she would immediately re-
ceive an email informing her of the infraction, and offer her either
the chance to comply within a reasonable period of time or to take
advantage of the delineated MRO appeal procedures.
Each month, in accordance with the Copyright Act's new, sim-
plified procedures, Peggy's assistant, Ryan, enters the names of all
the songs Peggy wishes to include in her podcast into the MRO
website. The website informs Ryan which songs are, or currently,
are not, subject to the MRL. The site also tells Ryan the date the
songs that are not currently subject to the MRL shall become sub-
ject to it. Every month, at their podcast staff meeting, Ryan and
Peggy decide whether they would like to use those songs, or wait
until the ARRC period is over. When the ARRC period is over,
those songs will fall under Peggy's "blanket" MRL monthly license.
Peggy's podcast is a rousing success.., and the public is richer for
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